As a member of the Group of Ministers that oversaw the division of the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh, former Union Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh had a ringside view of the momentous events that accompanied the process. He talks about his book, Old History, New Geography: Bifurcating Andhra Pradesh , and about the current crisis in the Congress. Excerpts from an interview:
There is a widespread perception that the decision to divide Andhra Pradesh was taken solely by the then Home Minister P. Chidambaram.
Many people in the Congress saw it as a solo venture but I have gone to great lengths to quote Chidambaram in Parliament… where he has contradicted this claim. Chidambaram was at pains to explain that no home minister can undertake a solo venture of this kind. The December 9, 2009, statement on Telangana was made after confabulation, both at the party level and the government level. In the last stage, the Prime Minister, the President, Chief Minister K. Rosaiah and Chidambaram were involved. That statement was a turning point. It created the impression that the government had finally decided to create Telangana, though it took almost four years to do it.
Why was the UPA unable to gauge what Andhra journalists were telling at the time — that K. Chandrasekhar Rao (KCR)just wanted attention?
There was an intelligence perception that this was what I call in the book a Potti Sriramulu (who fasted to death for Telangana) moment. Of course, KCR was fasting in an airconditioned room at the Nizam Institute of Medical Sciences. However, if the December 9 statement suggested that the doors to Telangana had been opened, the December 23 statement showed a greater degree of ambivalence.
Why didn’t the UPA government insist on a resolution on Telangana by the Andhra Pradesh assembly?
The Congress had committed itself in 2004 to a second States’ Reorganisation Commission (SRC). But statements from Abhishek Singhvi and Shakeel Ahmed closed the doors to it. These are all the ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ of history… An all-party meeting was called in 2010; then in early February 2010, the Srikrishna Commission was constituted. The commission’s report said the best option was to not go for bifurcation, (but) if bifurcation becomes inevitable, then it must be done with the cooperation of all parties concerned. There is a long historical context to Telangana, going back to the 1950s. Secondly, all political parties except the CPI-M had given in writing that they wanted Telangana. Thirdly, there was the social factor — the suicides and agitations.
The Congress was decimated in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
The Congress paid a huge price in Andhra, we performed miserably in Telangana even though we created it. However, it would be wrong to look at bifurcation only from a Congress point of view… five years down the line, looking at the history, politics and social factors, bifurcation had become inevitable. This is not an open and shut case. It was a political call that was taken by the Congress that proved to be a disaster from an electoral point of view
Were there any gains on the development front?
Andhra Pradesh had become totally Hyderabad-centric, all the development, whether in industry, IT, infrastructure or public sector. Bifurcation opened up opportunities for Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada, Guntur, Amaravati, Tirupati and Warangal in Telangana. It will happen in Andhra; it may not happen in Telangana, as the investments are still happening around Hyderabad. The development that is taking place in the new state of Andhra Pradesh would not have happened if bifurcation had not taken place.
Could the creation of Telangana have been avoided had the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1956 —providing political and economic safeguards for the region — not been violated?
Had the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1956 not been violated, had the All-Party Agreement of 1969 been implemented, had the six-point formula announced in 1973 been implemented, maybe the demand for Telangana would not have erupted the way it did. But had N. Chandrababu Naidu been a little more generous and made KCR a cabinet minister, maybe KCR would not have formed the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS).
Why did the Congress fail to accommodate TRS in Telangana?
There was some expectation that the TRS would merge with the Congress. KCR started his life in the Congress. There was an expectation that there would either be a merger or an electoral understanding but the local Congress was so confident that we would win Telangana on our own, because we had created Telangana, that they were not willing to go with KCR. The economic strategy followed by Naidu created a huge boom in Hyderabad, which was filled with investment from outside Telangana, which created resentment that people from outside were taking away the land and the investments, which KCR was able to exploit.
What are the lessons from the experience for the Congress?
Political intelligence, political management, political troubleshooting, political communications and political outreach are absolutely crucial.
Would things have been different if Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR) had not died in a helicopter crash in 2009?
YSR’s death gave KCR life. His party was facing all sorts of problems, extortions, passport scams… Remember YSR had committed to Telangana on the floor of the House and Jagan (YSR Congress president Y.S. Jaganmohan Reddy) also gave a statement in favour of Telangana. Could YSR have prevented the formation of Telangana? I can’t say. Could YSR have managed the formation of Telangana better? Perhaps. He was a local strongman, he was manipulative, charismatic, resourceful and powerful. Had YSR lived, things might well have been different.
How do you think the Congress handled the Jagan episode?
We opened up the Jagan front along with the Telangana front. In retrospect, it looks as though we should have accommodated Jagan but the man wanted to be chief minister and I can’t say whether he should have been or not. But Rosaiah was an experienced administrator and had worked closely with YSR for many years.
Does every departure from the Congress party weaken it?
Everyone who has left the Congress has used the word Congress. Mamata Banerjee calls her party Trinamool Congress, Sharad Pawar calls his Nationalist Congress Party, and Jagan calls his party the YSR Congress Party. They may all have left the Congress but the Congress has not left them. No doubt anyone who leaves the party weakens it.
How do you intend to check departures from the party?
In times of adversity, the true Congressmen and women will be revealed; the time-servers and those who have milked the party for their personal ends will stand exposed. Of course, we must make every effort to retain our partymen, but if they see themselves as contractors and businessmen first and Congressmen later, as in the case of Andhra Pradesh or Telangana, for instance, then we can’t do much.
There is a perception that lacunae in the AP Reorganisation Act has led to a rift between Telangana and Andhra Pradesh over river waters and government employees.
I think this is the only Act that has detailed provisions, both institutionally and operationally, for managing the Krishna and Godavari waters. As far as the 70,000 employees are concerned, two committees have been formed, one for the central services and one for the state services, for their allocation. They have given their reports. The problems have nothing to do with the Act but with the political processes.
Is the current crisis in the Congress different from those the party has faced in the past?
The crisis is unprecedented in scope and character. We have faced crises in the past but we always had a sizeable presence in Parliament and the Vidhan Sabhas. We must recognise the unique nature of this crisis if we are to respond to it creatively and effectively. This crisis is also different in the sense that our opponent now is more vicious, more vituperative, more single-minded in his focus to destroy us. Vajpayee was fundamentally a decent man, tolerant and liberal, who grew up in the Nehruvian era and imbibed some of the values of that time. Modi is the complete opposite — totally intolerant and illiberal.
You are close to Rahul Gandhi. Do you think he is up to the job?
I have worked with him since 2004. Contrary to media perception, I don’t enjoy special status in relation to him. Of course, he is up to the job. His style is different. He is careful, considered and calibrated. He has a pathological dislike for “imposing” his decisions or his will on others. He is very democratic, and listens more than most people I know in politics. He is very sharp and analytical and asks probing questions. He is well-read too. It is taking him time to adjust to the rough and tumble of Indian politics. He wants a private space in an intensely public arena and I see nothing wrong with that. I also think he is much more interested in putting in place new systems and structures. He operates through institutional processes rather than individuals. All this is a new experience in a 131-year-old organisation.
Will Rahul take over this year and will his team blend the old and the new?
We all hope he takes over sooner rather than later. Undoubtedly, his team will be a mix of the old and the new but I certainly hope the emphasis is on the youth and new faces. Oldies like me can be used in a variety of ways.
Will Sonia Gandhi continue to have a role in the party after Rahul takes over?
We all expect her to continue to play an important role, perhaps as the chairperson of the Congress Parliamentary Party. She has led the Congress magnificently since April 1998.
