#dnaEdit: Rethinking diplomacy

Are Indian diplomats equipped to present the new status of India as an emerging power in the world? Indian policymakers have been raising this question since economic liberalisation was introduced in the country. In the early 1990s, then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao felt that Indian embassies should serve as the front-office for foreign investors and businessmen. Indian embassies, it was felt, must have a strong commercial section, and the commercial attache must play a more important role in international business policies. 

It became evident in the 1990s that Indian negotiators at the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) who were involved in the formation of World Trade Organisation (WTO), were at a disadvantage because the career diplomats conducting the complex negotiations, were not well-versed in international commerce and legal niceties of commercial treaties. It was argued that  India could have bargained better at the GATT-WTO platform if the delegation had included international trade experts. 

This, however, is not meant to disqualify the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) recruits as incompetent. They were good in executing their role in a world which revolved around secretive power games at the political level. But in the new world of complicated international trade and security networks, the old skills of a classical diplomat seem to be falling short. 

It seems that the BJP-government is now preparing to respond to some of the changing needs of the country, in the international arena. The first stage is a cautious one of getting research scholars of international relations into the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) so that they can prepare analytical and well-researched position papers about each region. This would serve as a crucial input for policy and for decision-making. The IFS officers will continue to represent the country but they will now be better equipped in terms of information in dealing with the questions that are likely to emerge at the negotiating table. The traditional diplomat is not being replaced. He or she is being provided with a formidable back-up. 

There will be many who would argue that this is not a sufficient response, and that there is need for a radical rethink on the ways to conduct diplomacy. Those who are in favour of changing the IFS from as it exists now would argue that there should be a cross-fertilisation of ideas and minds from different streams, and that foreign service personnel cannot rule the roost in splendid isolation any more. There is predictable resistance to the idea of a root-and-branch change in the IFS, by serving diplomats as well as by the IFS old-timers. 

Some of the retired diplomats argue that what the IFS needs is to increase its cadre strength, which is a valid argument. For a large country like India, a mere 900-strong diplomatic cadre is shamefully inadequate. The United States has a diplomatic contingent of 20,000 while the Chinese have a 4,000-strong contingent. The Indian government therefore needs to recruit more people in the foreign service. 

It is however ironical that in the civil services examination which serves as a common entry point for the IFS, the top-rankers prefer the domestic Indian Administrative Service (IAS) because of its greater clout in the bureaucratic power structure. It is an IAS officer who occupies the highest bureaucratic position of cabinet secretary, while the foreign secretary, which marks the pinnacle for the IFS officer, ranks much lower in governmental hierarchy. As a consequence, the brightest — assuming the top-ranking candidates in the civil services examination represent the best — do not seem to opt for IFS. What is needed then is a different method of choosing Indian diplomats rather than culling them from the common pool as is the present practice. Induction of research scholars into the MEA is a good start, but there is need for greater change to make a real difference to the way India conducts its diplomatic and international dealings.