In the realm of ifs and buts

Prime Minister Modi’s two flying visits to Afghanistan to inaugurate the India-built Parliament in Kabul and Salma Dam in Herat are memorable for his resounding oratory: “Friendship is my faith; the friend is my life — this is the creed of Afghans and Indians. India will stand by Afghanistan against all odds. There is no sunset clause. Our ties are timeless.” These commitments will be hard to keep after the breakdown of talks and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) facing, on an average, 21 attacks and losing 40 soldiers every week in the Taliban summer offensive, Operation Omari, dedicated to legendary Taliban leader Mullah Omar.

Taking out the Pakistan-installed Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour with a drone in May near Quetta was US reprisal for Taliban reneging on peace talks orchestrated by the Quadrilateral Coordination Group consisting of US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The reconciliation process has been held hostage due to differences among Taliban between pro- and anti-reconciliation factions, power struggle for leadership and Pakistan ISI’s own sense of strategic timing. Americans with the help of the British have worked for years on direct talks between Kabul and Taliban ideally without ‘minder’ ISI. Peace efforts assumed urgency for creating an enabling environment for a US withdrawal from Afghanistan to allow President Obama another diplomatic success before he demits office next year.

US AF-Pak envoy Richard Olson told members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Taliban must face consequences of calling off peace talks and that Pakistan must go after terrorists that threaten their neighbours. President Obama called Mansour an “obstacle to peace”.  

The Americans are furious with Pakistan, the most favoured non-Nato-ally-turned-frenemy. Years of pent up anger and frustration have come to the fore even as US Senators’ taunt that “we are paying Pakistan to have our soldiers killed in Afghanistan by Taliban and Haqqanis” still resonate. US aid to Pakistan since 2001 has been around USD 35 bn. The latest National Defence Authorisation Act requires the US Defense Secretary to certify that Pakistani Army operations in North Waziristan will disrupt the Haqqani network and their sanctuaries. The US has also withheld the sale of F16 by refusing to subsidise it. US-Pakistan relations have hit rock bottom.

The Afghans are livid with Pakistan after the recent border clashes and the April 19 deadly Kabul truck bomb attack. Kabul has taken Pakistan to the UNSC. President Ashraf Ghani, once the most pro-Pakistan leader, has become the most anti-Pakistan leader and has devised a five-year war strategy to defeat the Taliban. Pakistan is the undisputed but derided kingpin of Af-Pak imbroglio. Gen Raheel Sharif told US Ambassador David Hale that the drone attack violated Pakistan’s national sovereignty, was counter-productive to the peace process and a low point in US-Pakistan relations. Just a day before the drone strike and two days after Taliban failed to show up for talks, Pakistan Foreign Secretary Aijaz Chaudhary changed tack on talks saying that for dialogue to take place, the ANSF must gain ascendency over Taliban on the battlefield; only then will Taliban realise there is more to gain from talks than from fighting. This is a tacit acceptance that Pakistan is unwilling (not unable) to bring Taliban to the negotiating table and is in sync with de facto Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz’s charade about Pakistan exercising influence, not control, over Taliban. It also confirms that the Taliban are split over talks when they reckon that greater battlefield gains will put them in a better bargaining position after the ongoing Operation Omari. Islamabad apparently confirms this.

The ISI control over Taliban is evident from the rapid power-struggle-free succession of leadership following the droning of Mullah Mansour. The chosen successor was not Mullah Qayyum Zakir, the most senior leader after Mansour but the cleric Maulvi Haibutullah Akhundzada, former Chief Justice and religious scholar during the five-year Taliban rule. In the leadership hierarchy Sirajuddin Haqqani remains the dominant leader and one of the two deputies to Haibatullah. He is also the chief planner and coordinator of all military operations. The second deputy is Mullah Omar’s son Mullah Yaqub. Meanwhile, ANSF and ordinary Afghans are facing Taliban revenge attacks for the decapitation strike of its leader. Helmand is very close to falling completely. Recent kidnappings and attacks in Helmand and Konduz with Taliban taking hundreds hostage and executing dozens show the resolution and determination for confrontation. Capture of another provincial capital like Kunduz last year would be a valuable prize during talks, provided the Taliban can hold on to it.

Is there a bigger political role for India given the growing distrust between US and Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan, the phenomenal uptick in US-India political and defence ties and superb India- Afghanistan relations? Last week, Mr Olson said at Washington’s Atlantic Council that India and Iran would be included in peace efforts at a later stage once talks get started. Expansion of the QCG is on the table to include Russia and Iran which are separately engaged in talks with Taliban. Even as China is not a very active player, it is difficult to conceive how India can be brought into QCG given Pakistan’s sensitivities. Pakistan is still the only country that can prompt the Taliban to engage in talks with Kabul. Still the trust deficit between Kabul and Rawalpindi is so big that Afghans are inclined to look beyond Pakistan. What this might entail is worth exploring. One possibility is for an enlarged Shanghai Cooperation Organisation including India and Pakistan and later Afghanistan and Iran which has just met in Toshkent, to operationalise its summit declarations of last three years to ensuring Afghanistan’s neutrality through non-interference. A regional approach under SCO to end cross-border terrorism is essential alongside supporting peace process which it has endorsed.

Meanwhile, New Delhi should step up its military training and assistance programmes while continuing with institution- and capacity-building schemes. Chabahar Trade and Transit Corridor will present new opportunities for working with Iran and Russia in Afghanistan. Operation Omari will soon pick up and could lead towards another Konduz moment coinciding with the US presidential elections in November. A strategic military collapse or a breakup of the National Unity Government are seen as horrendous but unlikely scenarios. In any event Mr Modi should be prepared to walk the talk: strengthen ANSF and ready contingency plans beyond evacuation of Indian nationals “to stand by Afghanistan against all odds”. 

The author is the convenor of the India-Afghanistan Policy Group