While the attack may determine the threshold for both countries and reposition red lines, Pakistan's military is not necessarily interested in unmanageable escalation
The involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba in the attack is not confirmed. In fact, it is unlikely that the Pakistani army will seriously consider this allegation by India.
Who were the three men involved in carrying out the attack in Gurdaspur on July 27, which the Indian press says came from Pakistani soil? The involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba in the attack is not confirmed. In fact, it is unlikely that the Pakistani army will seriously consider this allegation by India. The attack was downplayed in Pakistan as a purposeful exaggeration to malign the country. In any case, two days after Gurdaspur, the seemingly extra-judicial police operation resulting in Lashkar-e-Jhangvi's leader Malik Ishaq's death has overshadowed any debate on the Punjab incident, and fuels a growing perception that Pakistan is sincerely trying to eliminate terrorism.
Moreover, the Pakistani media is completely preoccupied with the coverage of Indian intelligence agency RAW's operations in Pakistan, a story that has even made progressive elements in the country blink. Now, whenever some people complain about the state not fighting certain terror networks, there are others that immediately remind you of the impending threat from India. The war against terrorism and terror groups cannot be fought without involving Pakistan's civil society, a battle that has become tougher to fight. The Indian leadership's proud admission of breaking Pakistan or paying it back in the same coin in terms of terrorism just adds to a state's justification to go the extra mile for its protection.
Although there is a general perception that the Gurdaspur attack comes as a spoiler response to the renewal of the India-Pakistan diplomatic engagement in Ufa, one feels it predates Ufa and was bound to happen sooner or later. The jihadis behind the attack seem to be testing the waters and the messaging is multi-layered. For one, it indicates that the jihadi project has not been wrapped up even though there is an ongoing military onslaught against the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Tehrik-E Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It also indicates the intent and capacity of terror groups to strike anywhere in India. It is still not proven if the terrorists were destined for Punjab but wherever they wanted to strike was probably meant to signal to sleeper cells inside India or even in Pakistan that militancy is still alive and there is a method to remain relevant-fighting the right jihad.
Indeed, the joint statement at Ufa cannot be compared with the Lahore declaration before the Kargil conflict or peace overtures between the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and UPA governments before 26/11. Indeed, the Nawaz Sharif who went to Russia did not enjoy the same level of confidence he did in 1999. At Ufa his mandate was limited to rescuing the country and security establishment from a situation where diplomatic and military tension escalated to a point that both its patrons, the Chinese and the Americans, noticed it. Later on, many Pakistani analysts lamented Sharif's incompetence and the civil-military divide in handling India. But how could a prime minister so weakened by political campaigns against him and an understanding that India was one of the reasons for the military being upset with him take a suicidal step?
Moreover, the joint statement cannot be projected as a major victory for India and a diplomatic defeat for Pakistan. Kashmir was part of the subtext, a fact that was explained to interested parties by Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz on his return from Ufa. Main text or subtext, the issue does not lose its relevance for Pakistan and its security establishment.
In many ways, the meeting in Russia reset the diplomatic threshold in South Asia-other significant global players would prefer some semblance of relative stability in the region. Also, there is a global interest in engaging with both South Asian states which means that the conversation regarding peace and stability ought to be expanded. Possibly, China could play a more effective role.
While ordinary folk get thrilled by the message of peace in Bollywood's Bajrangi Bhaijaan, for the securityconscious it is Kashmir and India more than Afghanistan or Taliban that still sell far better. Not that the security establishment does not realise the high cost of the military option in Kashmir, but this is what is needed to keep the militant option alive and viable even for use in other places such as Afghanistan, or generally to protect the state. The new army leadership presents itself as more professional and upright than the previous one. This also means emphasising its willingness and readiness to protect the country against what is considered as the most serious threat to the state, India.
While the Gurdaspur attack may determine the threshold for both states and reposition red lines, Pakistan's military is not necessarily interested in unmanageable escalation. There is a general confidence that a conflict will not escalate due to the deterrence offered by nuclear weapons. And it does not rule out exploring the potential vulnerability of 'East Punjab' that could be used to counter the proxy war between the two neighbours. The security community is very conscious of the Indian national security adviser's intent to heighten the temperature of proxy war between the two states, a realisation that may demand searching for advantageous options. There is also an assumption that there is a certain political discomfort in India's Punjab and that it can be exploited. But there is little understanding in Pakistan that today the Khalistan issue is more political than militant.
A more critical issue at this stage perhaps is that both sides are at crosspurposes. New Delhi is in negotiation with Rawalpindi via Islamabad, which means a lot is lost in translation. In Pakistan itself there is no single ownership of the anti-terror policy due to the political system being a hybrid-military rule at the moment. There is certainly no clear sense inside Pakistan of who has control of anti-terror policymaking. The government may have made the counterterrorism National Action Plan, but it's the military and paramilitary that implement it at will and that too selectively. Perhaps, Delhi needs to think about who else to include in a direct conversation.
Ayesha Siddiqa is a security analyst and author of Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy