1.11 20.20 (edited)

Motion for Reconsideration
1.11 Bernardo v. CA 275 SCRA 413
1.12 Casuela v. Ombudsman 276 SCRA 635
1.13 Cordenillio v. Executive Secretary 276 SCRA 652
1.14 Chua v. CA 287 SCRA 33
1.15 De la Cruz v. Abelle 352 SCRA 691
1.16 Rodreguez v. CA GR 134275 August 7, 2002
1.17 Gonzales v. CSC 490 SCRA 741
1.18 Berboso v. CA 494 SCRA 583
1.19 Pontejos v. Desierto 592
Suretyship
1.20 Stronghold Insurance v. CA 205 SCRA 605
Tariff and Customs Code
2.11 Feeder v. CA 197 SCRA 842
Appeal
2.12 Alba v. Deputy Ombudsman 254 SCRA 753
2.13 Telan v. CA 202 SCRA 246
2.14 Rivera v. CSC 240 SCRA 43
2.15 Singson v. NLRC 274 SCRA 358
2.16 Building Care v. Macaraeg 687 SCRA 643
Closure Proceedings
2.17 CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536
2.18 Rural Bank v. CA 162 SCRA 288
2.19 Phil. Merchants v. CA GR 112844 June 2, 1995
Biddings
2.20 Concerned Officials v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502
UDHA
3.11 Perez v. Madrona 668 SCRA 696
Cancellation of Property Rights/Privileges
3.12 American Inter-Fashion v. OP, 197 SCRA 409
3.13 Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma, 254 SCRA 565
3.14 ABAKADA v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
3.15 British American Tobacco v. Camacho 562 SCRA 511, 585 SCRA 36
Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-Ombudsman
3.16 Roxas v. Vasquez GR 114944 June 19, 2001
3.17 Ocampo v. Ombudsman 322 SCRA 17
3.18 Serapio v. Sandiganbayan GR 148468 Jan. 28, 2003
Substantive Due Process
3.19 US v. Toribio – 15 Phil. 85
3.20 Churchill v. Rafferty – 32 Phil. 580
4.11 People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172
Facts: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-
appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a
building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
Ruling: No,The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an
arbitrary and unlimited conferment. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures
offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.An ordinance
which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is
plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
4.12 Ermita Hotel vs City of Manila
Facts:Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.They
claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that
hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
license fees for first and second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information.There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative
of due process for being vague.The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant
and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.It was also unlawful
for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.There was also a prohibition
for persons below 18 in the hotel.The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license
of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Ruling: No,The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute.Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. Due process is not a narrow or
"technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a
clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Licenses for non-
useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a
much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police
power.On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being.The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle.
4.13 Ynot vs Intermediate Court of Appeals
Facts:Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.The original
E.O was for prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos, except under certain conditions, for the purpose of preserving
them for the benefit of small farmers.
Issue:Is the Amendment valid?

Ruling:No, outright confiscation is not reasonably related to the purpose. Moreover, it is unduly oppressive.The
owner of the property is denied the opportunity to be heard and the property is immediately confiscated and
distributed.
14.4 Agustin Vs Edu
Facts:This petition assails the validity of LOI 229,issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all
vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such
vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. Incompliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land
Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No.1 directing the compliance thereof. Petitioner also
stressed out that the said LOI and A.O are unlawful for it is undue delegation of Police Power.
Issue:Whether the LOI is considered as a valid delegation of Police Power
Ruling:Police power, is nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
Also,the police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property
to promote the general welfare. It is the power to describe regulatins to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, and general welfare of the people. Government limitations to protect constitutional rights
did not also intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure
communal peace.There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.The presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record in over throwing the statuteThere was no
constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional provision.LOI 229 doesn’t
force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement from any
source.
The objective is public safety.
4.15 Balacuit Vs CFI 163 SCRA 182
Facts:The City of Butuan issues an ordinance prescribing that between the ages of 7 and 12 should be charged
only half the admission price in movie houses.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and
constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.
Ruling:No. For the benefit of parents then the cost is passed on to cinema owners. There is no discernible
relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the
bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most
for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
4.16 National Development Co. and New Agrix v. Phil Veterans Bank 192 SCRA 257
Facts: The Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans
Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over three (3) parcels of land situated in Los Baños, Laguna.
During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. It was for the expressed purpose of salvaging this
and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos.Pursuant thereto,
the private respondent filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In the
meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development Company, petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1)
of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the cancellation of the
mortgage lien in favor of the private respondent. For its part, the private respondent took steps to extrajudicially
foreclose the mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a second case with the same court to stop the
foreclosure.The petitioners argue that property rights, like all rights, are subject to regulation under the police
power for the promotion of the common welfare.
Issue: May the petitioner invoke police power in the case at bar?
Ruling:The police power is not a panacea for all constitutional maladies. Neither does its mere invocation
conjure an instant and automatic justification for every act of the government depriving a person of his life,
liberty or property.A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method. In more familiar words, a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and b) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
4.17 Maranaw Hotel v NLRC 238 SCRA 190

14.18 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties – 234 SCRA 255
Facts:ordinance no. 3353 an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing
business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the
operation of casino.The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No.
3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City.
Issue:May the state prohibit gambling?
Ruling:The state may do so,if it chooses, and make violation a criminal offense. But gambling is not immoral
per se.
4.19 Bennis Vs Michigan March 4, 1996
Facts:Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged in a sexual act with a prostitute in the
automobile while it was parked on a Detroit city street. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency.The State then
sued both Bennis and his wife, petitioner Tina B. Bennis, to have the car declared a public nuisance and abated
as such.
Issue:Whether Michigan's abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her interest in the forfeited car without
due process.
Ruling:A long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason
of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use. In
Dobbins's Distillery v.United States, this Court upheld that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest of the
owner whether he be innocent or guilty."
4.20 Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri – No. 88-1503 June 25 1990
Facts:Missouri denied the withdrawal of treatment request because Ms. Cruzan’s parents could not establish
Ms. Cruzan’s wishes regarding such withdrawal by clear and convincing evidence. Ms. Cruzan had a discussion
with a friend who testified in court that she said she would not want to be on life support, but this was the only
evidence of her personal wishes.
Issue:Does Missouri have a legitimate state interest in tempering the liberty interests of incompetent patients?
Ruling:Yes. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) notes that unwanted medical treatment is considered a battery at
common law. Hence, it is clear that there must be a liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. However, the
treatment must be unwanted by the patient.
Missouri is free to choose whether or not they will accept a surrogate for an incompetent’s medical decisions,
but they are free to establish the standard by which they do so. That is a legislative, not judicial choice.
Dissent.Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) dissents, arguing that the State interest cannot outweigh Ms.
Cruzan’s liberty interest in having treatment withheld.
Concurrence.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor) concurs, emphasizing that the Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) did not have to decide whether a State must abide by the decisions of a medical surrogate.
Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalis) concurs, but writes separately to state his opinion that the federal courts have
no place making substantive decisions in this area, that this police power has always been afforded to the States.
5.11 JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. CA
FACTS: SOJ issued a Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedure and requirements for screening
performing artist. For deployment of female entertainers to Japan it required an Artist Record Book (ARB),
which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed
the required tests as precondition for the processing of the POEA of any contract for overseas employment.
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), filed a class suit assailing
these department orders, contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged
existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of
law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and
illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation
consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 3, as an exercise of police power, constitutes a violation
to due process of law.

RULING: No. No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when
their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the
public health and welfare and public morals. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the
due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to
the practice of various trades or professions. Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant
number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad. Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing
artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
5.12. Corona v. United Harbor – 283 SCRA 31
FACTS: In issuing administrative order no. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of
harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. On August 12, 1992, respondents United
Harbor Pilot Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-
AO no. 04-92. On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO no. 04-92.
On March 17. 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato Corona,
dismissed the appeal/ petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. Respondents filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and damages, before branch 6 of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not PPA-AO-04-92 violates respondents’ right to due process of law
RULING: Yes. The court is convinced that PPA-AO no. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’
right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The SC said that in order to fall within the
aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation
is done without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-
judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. There is no
dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. It is readily apparent that PPA-
AO no. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory
retirement.
5.13. Kelly v. Johnson – 425 US 238
FACTS: This case began in 1971, when a Civil Rights action was instituted against the Commissioner of the
Suffolk County Police Department by the president of the Suffolk County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association.
An order had been put into effect requiring that male members of the police force abide by certain hair-
grooming standards. Police officers were forbidden from having beards or goatees, and the length of hair and
sideburns were likewise regulated. There was an exception for medical need. The action was said to violate
Johnson’s First Amendment right of free expression, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process
and equal protection. The District Court dismissed Johnson’s complaint, and he appealed. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the District Court, where testimony was taken on the issue of whether there was a
“genuine public need” for these regulations. There was but one witness, the Suffolk County Police
Department’s Deputy Commissioner. He contended that the hair-grooming regulations met a need for
uniformity and satisfied a concern for public safety of the patrolmen. A ruling was made in favor of
Respondent based upon this testimony, with the District Court determining that there was no proof to support
these claims. The Court felt as if the police department was seeking “[u]niformity for uniformity’s sake.” The
District Court’s ruling was affirmed on petitioner’s appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the hair-grooming and hair-length regulations issued violated the Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights by infringing upon liberty interests.
RULING: No. The Court upheld the grooming regulations for police officers, thereby limiting the scope of
privacy concerns. The Court’s holding established that there is no protected liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment when it comes to personal appearance, distinguishing the case from those that impact an
individual’s choice with respect to basic and fundamental matters of procreation, marriage, sexual relations, and
family life. Justice Rehnquist noted that there were countless demands placed upon police officers, including
the need to wear a uniform, the requirement of saluting the flag while in uniform, the prohibition against
smoking in public, and the restriction against participating in political affairs. Rehnquist believed that Suffolk
County’s organized structure for its police force served the purpose of discipline and uniformity. The Court
looked at the hair-length regulation similarly, and declined to use the standard that had been applied by the
Court of Appeals, which had attempted to establish whether there was a “genuine public need” for the
regulation. The Supreme Court instead indicated that the standard was “whether respondent can demonstrate
that there is no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county’s method of organizing
its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property.” The Court ruled that the regulations were
not so irrational as to be deemed “arbitrary,” and therefore respondent had not been deprived of liberty. To the

contrary, the Court determined that similarity in appearance of police officers was desirable and served as a
rational basis for the regulations imposed by the police force.
5. 14. Chavez v. Romulo – 431 SCRA 534 (2004)
FACTS: Acting on President Arroyo’s directive in her speech on the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public
places to avert the rising crime incidents, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence. Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed
gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied.
Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents. The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of
the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and contends that (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to
issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3)
the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines
do not constitute an ex post facto law.
ISSUE: Whether the said guidelines violates the due process clause
RULING: In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty
or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain
privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: “Needless to
say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.” All property in the state is held subject
to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare
5.15. Cruz v. Flavier, GR 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz is a noted constitutionalist. He assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by
providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private
landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not IPRA violates rights of landowners
RULING: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A.
8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as
dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on
the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have
been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7,
and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was re-deliberated upon. However, after re-deliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.
5.16. Smith Kline v. CA, GR 121267, October 23, 2001
FACTS: In August 1989, Danlex Research Laboratories petitioned before Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) that it may be granted a compulsory license for the use and manufacture of the
pharmaceutical product Cimetidine. Cimetidine is useful as an antihistamine and in the treatment of
ulcers.Cimetidine is originally patented to Smith Kline and French Laboratories in 1978, and the said patent is

still in force at the time of application by Danlex Research. The BPTTT granted the application of Danlex
Research together with a provision that Danlex Research should be paying 2.5% of the net wholesale price as
royalty payment to Smith Kline. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Smith Kline assailed the grant as it
argued, among others, that the same is an invalid exercise of police power because there is no overwhelming
public necessity for such grant considering that Smith Kline is able to provide an adequate supply of it to satisfy
the needs of the Philippine market; that a provision in the Philippine Patent Laws is violative of the Paris
Convention to which the Philippines is a signatory. To explain the second contention, Smith Kline states that
the Paris Convention only allows compulsory licensing if the original licensee (patent holder) has failed to work
on the patent; that therefore, the provision in the Philippine Patent Laws which adds other grounds for the
granting of compulsory license i.e. monopoly, is invalid and contrary to the Paris Convention.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process
RULING: No. The granting is a valid exercise of police power. Cimetidine is medicinal in nature, and therefore
necessary for the promotion of public health and safety. On the second contention, Section A(2) of Article 5 [of
the Paris Convention] unequivocally and explicitly respects the right of member countries to adopt legislative
measures to provide for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which might result from the exercise
of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent. An example provided of possible abuses is “failure to work;”
however, as such, is merely supplied by way of an example, it is plain that the treaty does not preclude the
inclusion of other forms of categories of abuses. The legislative intent in the grant of a compulsory license was
not only to afford others an opportunity to provide the public with the quantity of the patented product, but also
to prevent the growth of monopolies. Certainly, the growth of monopolies was among the abuses which Section
A, Article 5 of the Convention foresaw, and which our Congress likewise wished to prevent in enacting.
5. 17. Pareno vs COA
Facts: The petitioner served for 32 years in AFP, upon retirement, he received his pension which is good for 3
years but later on he migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen so the AFP stopped the
petitioner’s monthly pension pursuant to PD 1638. Petitioner filed a claim before the respondent for the
continuance of such but was denied. Petitioner claim that he was deprived of his property when they stop the
continuance of his pension since a pension being a property vested by the constitution, cannot be removed or
taken from him just because he became a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner further alleges that the
termination of his monthly pension is a penalty equivalent to deprivation of his life.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was deprived of his property which is guaranteed by the due process clause
HELD: No, the SC held that retirement rights are future rights that the constitution only vested upon any person
who had retired from their service and such right is protected by the due process clause. The SC held that there
was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice
but to stop his monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638. Petitioner had the opportunity to
contest the termination of his pension when he requested for reconsideration of the removal of his name from
the list of retirees and the termination of his pension, but was denied the request pursuant to Section 27 of PD
1638.
5.18. Esponcilla vs Bagon Tanyag
Facts: Petitioners Jasmin Alipato, Primitivo Belandres, Nestor Leduna, Anita de los Reyes, and Gina Caballero
(petitioners) were among the actual occupants of the subject land. They occupied the land by mere tolerance
long before the said land was acquired by PCIB in 1989. To evade eviction from PCIB and in order to avail of
the benefits of acquiring land under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC), the said occupants formally organized themselves into an association, the
RHAI. With the aid and representation of the Bacolod Housing Authority (BHA), RHAI was able to obtain a
loan from the NHMFC and acquired the subject land from PCIB. As a consequence, the Registry of Deeds of
Bacolod City issued a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 202933, covering the 19,897 square-meter
land, in the name of RHAI. By virtue of the land acquisition by RHAI, all the occupants of the land became
automatic members of RHAI. To fully avail of the benefits of the CMP, the NHMFC required the RHAI
members to sign the Lease Purchase Agreement (LPA) and to maintain their membership in good standing in
accordance with the provisions of the By-Laws5 of RHAI. Petitioners, however, refused to sign the LPA as a
precondition under the CMP. They likewise failed to attend the regular meetings and pay their membership dues
as required by the RHAI By-Laws. As a result, RHAI through its Board of Directors, approved a resolution6 to
enforce the eviction of petitioners and recover possession of the portions of land which they were occupying.
The RTC decided in favor of RHAI because they found out that the occupants were unlawful occupants in the
area. The occupants contend that they were denied due process when the RTC decided in favor of RHAI.
Issue: Whether the occupants were denied due process of law.
Held: No, it ruled that petitioners were not denied of their right to procedural due process as they were given
opportunity to present evidence, but failed to do so. According to the CA, "where opportunity to be heard either
through oral argument or pleadings is accorded, there can be no denial of procedural due process.

5.19. BF vs CITY MAYOR
Facts: BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision (BF Homes Parañaque), with a land area straddling the cities of
Parañaque, Las Piñas, and Muntinlupa, is the largest subdivision in the country.The Municipal Council of
Parañaque enacted an Ordinance prescribing the land use plan &zoning pursuant to the LGC. Secs 11.5 & 11.6
of the Ordinance, reclassified El Grande and Aguirre Avenues from residential to commercial areas. Petitioners
filed with the CA a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality of Secs 11.5,11.6, etc: the
reclassification of certain portions is unconstitutional because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between
the developer and the lot buyers. The annotation on the lot buyers’ titles provides that "the property shall be
used for residential purposes only and for no other purpose."
Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.
Held: Yes, The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the
defendant-appellee–referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee–it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people."
5.20. ST. LUKE’S VS NLRC 517 SCRA 677
FACTS: The private respondent Maribel Santos worked as an X-Ray technician at the petitioner hospital
(SLMC) but she does not possess a certificate of registration as required under the newly passed Radiologic Act
or RA 7431. Due to her non-compliance and her failure to pass the exams, she was separated.
The private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other monetary
benefits. The Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay respondent separation pay and this was affirmed by
both NLRC and the Court of Appeals, hence this petition. The petitioner contended that respondent dismissal
was valid.
Issue: Whether the dismissal was valid.
HELD: Yes, while the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may
be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and the general welfare of the people.
Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The
most concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has
been closely regulated by the State.
6. 11 Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners
assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act
of 2003.” Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens.
Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to
the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare.
6.12 PEREZ V. LPG
6.13 MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc
Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport System for Greater
Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus
terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus operators who had
bus terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared unconstitutional and
illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over
their respective terminals
Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power

Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone legislative power. In light
of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the
Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake
the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the respondents’ terminals.
Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being
delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative
boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government under an express
delegation by the LGC of 1991.
6.14 SEC of DND V. MANALO
FACTS: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on
the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to
stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of Right to liberty and other basic rights of Manalo Brothers?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of Manalo’s right to security. The Writ of
Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been
violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by
private individuals or entities. Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment
and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of
respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent
threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their
liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.
6.15 Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
FACTS: Petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous
Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) RA 9165 from enforcement on the
ground that they are constitutionally infirm for the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices, For the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is breached by said provisions.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9165 violates the people’s right gainst unreasonable searches?
HELD: The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of
public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court ruled that, unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy, has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and
2 of the Constitution.
6.16. Social Justice Society v. Atienza
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance reclassifying certain areas of the city from
industrial to commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in those areas were no
longer allowed. Though the oil companies assailed the validity of the ordinance contending they will lose
billions of pesos because of the enactment of the said ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether the enactment of the ordinance is within the scope of Police Power of Sanguniang
Panglungsod of Manila?
HELD: In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness,
the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to
the end in view.
The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment
of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any
resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust.
6.17 SEC vs. INTERPORT SERVICES
FACTS: Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that criminal complaints for violations
of rules and regulations enforced or administered by the SEC shall be referred to the Department of Justice

(DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the SEC nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers.
Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the
aforementioned law.
Respondent claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process when it ordered that the respondents appear
before the SEC and show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them,
and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the Securities Regulations Code violates the right to due process of the respondents?
HELD: SEC retains jurisdiction to investigate. The Court of Appeals determined that there were no
implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised
Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly violated. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative
proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without violating their rights to due process and equal
protection. It further resolved that absent any implementing rules, the SEC cannot be allowed to quash the
assailed Omnibus Orders for the sole purpose of re-filing the same case against the respondents.
6.18 PEOPLE V. SITON
FACTS: Siton et al. were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202(2) of the RPC. They filed separate
motions to quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
The MTC denied the motions and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police
power and justified by the maxim “ salus populi est suprema lex.” The MTC also noted that in the affidavit of
the arresting officer it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on Siton et al. in an area reported
to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.
ISSUE: Whether the Law on Vagrancy is constitutional?
HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL. The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is
legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state as an aspect of police power. Police power
is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. As a police power
measure, Art. 202(2) must be viewed in a constitutional light.
6.19 WHITE LIGHT V. CITY OF MANILA
(Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights)
FACTS: In 1992, then Mayor Lim signed an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an
operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance is nullified as the said Ordinance infringes
on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid
as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It
also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen
up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare
7.11 Southern Hemisphere v Anti-Terrorism Council 632 SCRA 146
FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Council. Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts
ISSUE: WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper.

RULING: No. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
7.12 Roxas v Macapagal-Arroyo 630 SCRA 211
FACTS: Decision of the SC, after finding that the failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the
respondents’ responsibility anent her abduction and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary
diligence on the part of existing police and military investigations, this Court ordered the conduct of further
investigations, to be spearheaded by the CHR. The CHR was then required to submit a report of its
investigations as well as recommendation to the CA. Finally, the CA was directed to monitor the investigations
and submit to the Court its own report and recommendation.
ISSUE: Can the CA conduct a summary hearing to require the personal appearance of confidential witnesses
interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under oath?
RULING: The court ruled in affirmative. The Court pointed out that “while the CHR investigations have
already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate any of the public respondents in the
abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized. The court agreed that bringing the persons
interviewed, before a summary hearing will serve as a huge step towards identifying the persons behind the
abduction and torture. Thus, the Court must ensure that each and every possible theory was pursued and
verified.
7.13 Meralco v Lim 632 SCRA 195
FACTS: Lim is an administrative clerk at MERALCO, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of her
assigned office denouncing respondent. By Memorandum of Alexander (head of MERALCO Human Resource
Staffing), he directed the transfer of respondent to another sector due to the accusations and threats against her
from unknown individuals and which could possible compromise her safety and security. Lim filed a TRO for
her transfer and a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas data against MERALCO commanding MERALCO,
to wit:
1. Full disclosure of a the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly
received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security;
2. The nature of such data and the purpose of its collection;
3. The measure taken by MERALCO to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and
4. The currency and accuracy of such data or information;
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas data is proper in this case.
RULING: No, the writ of habeas data directs the issuance only against public officials or employees, or private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved
party’s person, family or home and MERALCO is not engage in such activities.
Habeas data is designated to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life,
liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. There is no showing from the facts
presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy, life,
liberty or security.
7.14 Pollo v Karina Constantino, GR 181881, October 8, 2011
FACTS: CSC Chairperson Karina David received a document from an anonymous source, making her aware
that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then formed personnel and directed them to back up all
the files of the computers found therein. David found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents
that are related to administrative cases and were for on the behalf of parties who were facing charges. David
inferred that he was willfully aiding their adverse interests and it was a practice that he pursued regularly.
Pollo argued that he was not even a lawyer to pursue such acts. He also asserted that the CSC conducted
a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was violated and that the source of the complaint was anonymous.
The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713. After some motions filed to the CSC, he filed his motion to the
CA wherein he was ordered to be dismissed of his governmental duties. The CA ruled that the search was legal
because in their capacity as employers, the government agencies could validly conduct search and seizure in the
governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or warrant requirement for search and seizure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal
files without his knowledge and consent constituted a violation of his constitutional right to privacy.
RULING: No. First, SC found that he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work computer. He did not
have a separate office space nor did he use a password for his computer. The CSC also implemented a policy
that its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything on their office computers, and
that the CSC may monitor their use. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the
computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes. Second, the search were conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint. A
search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
7.15 Sto. Tomas v Salac 685 SCRA 245
FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of RA 8042:
Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in violation of RA
8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid
claims and damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is
void for being violative of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said provisions of RA
8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Is the validity of RA 8042 violative of due process?
RULING: No. The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them jointly and
solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that
company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
Equal Protection Clause of the Law
7.16 People v Cayat 68 PHIL 12, 18
FACTS: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian
tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one
bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native
of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive,
have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than
the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the
passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory
and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police
power.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said
law.
RULING:No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under
the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The requisites to be complied
with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
7.17 Ichong v Hernandez 101 PHIL 1155
FACTS: Petitioner, in behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” filed to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection
of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is
not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity
to entitle it to engage in the retail business is unconstitutional
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws
RULING: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not

demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.
7.18 Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private
respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of
such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, hence this case.
ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
RULING: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection
rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor
who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to
admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
7.19 Dumlao v COMELEC 96 SCRA 392
FACTS: Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 disqualifies retired elective officials who has received retirement benefits and is
already 65 years old to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Petitioner Patricio
Dumlao said it is concocted and designed against him to prevent him from running again as Governor.
ISSUE: Is Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 violative of equal protection?
RULING: No. There is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the
retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change
of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it
permit of such denial.
7.20 Goesaert v Cleary 335 US 464
FACTS: A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with populations greater than
50,000, but the statute also stated that a woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or
daughter of the male owner" of a liquor establishment. Two female bartenders challenged the law, requesting an
injunction against its enforcement, on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
rejected the bartenders' claim.
ISSUE: Did the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access to licenses, violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
RULING: No. the Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line
between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them
to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the
statute, could have determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and social problems
against which it may devise preventive measures." The Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position to
"cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators."
8.11 Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City Feb 7 1968
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US
and other foreign countries. Said company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc,
its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging said ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause
and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar
central in Ormoc City at the time.
Issue:WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection of laws and
uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

Ruling: Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance
shoouldn’t be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class
as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.
EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable classificationof the
subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
8.12 Sison Jr. v. PAGCOR May 14 1991
Facts: Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869 – for being allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward “crony economy”, waiving the Manila City government’s right
to impose taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies
in the Constitution.
Issue: Won it violates the equal protection clause
Ruling: Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because
"it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution,
drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted
meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572,
December 21, 1989).
8.13 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 230 SCRA 711
Facts: Before 1986, the Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose de Venecia, Jr.,
was able to obtain foreign loans syndicated by various banks aggregating approximately one hundred twenty
million US dollars ($120 M). These foreign loans were guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board of
Directors was then composed of private respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta,
Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin, and Cezar Zalamea. Congressman de Venecia's group of
companies was unable to seasonably service these foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to
assume its obligation as guarantor. The EDSA revolution in February 1986 swept the Marcoses out of power.
One of the first official acts of then President Corazon C. Aquino was the creation of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) under E.O No. 1. It was given the difficult task of recovering the
illegal wealth of the Marcoses, their family, subordinates and close associates. In due time, the Marcoses and
their cronies had to face a flurry of cases, both civil and criminal, all designed to recover the Republic's wealth
allegedly plundered by them while in power. Case No. 0020 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting,
Restitution and Damages was one of these cases. It was filed by the petitioner Republic against Jose de Venecia,
Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C.
Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. Zalamea. We quote its relevant allegations.
Issue: Won the dismissal is compelled by the equal protection of laws
Ruling: Yes. The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is compelled by the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. De Venecia, Jr., and the respondents Bondoc and company are similarly situated.
Respondent Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint only because they allegedly gave unwarranted favors
to de Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the latter's foreign loans. When petitioner admitted that no undue favor was
granted to de Venecia, Jr. in the grant of such guaranty facilities and dismissed its complaint against him,
petitioner cannot avoid its duty of dismissing its complaint against respondents Bondoc and company. To give a
more favored treatment to de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to indulge in invidious
discrimination.
8.14 Himagan vs, People 237 SCRA 538
Facts: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of and
attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder
case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)
day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case
shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over

90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection of laws.
Issue: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution
Ruling: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman
criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec
47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
8.15 Almonte vs. Vasquez 244 SCRA 286
Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and
Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena
duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
Issue: WON petitioners can be ordered to produce documents without violating their equal protection of laws.
Ruling: Yes. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed,
EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters without compelling production, 19 no similar excuse can be made for a privilege
resting on other considerations
8.16 Telebap vs. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal
standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or
threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite
standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the
Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in
newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC
free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the
radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air
time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in
view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue: Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws
Ruling: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want
to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is
likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a
fair exchange for what the industry gets.
8.17 Tiu vs. CA GR127410 Jan 20 1999
Facts: Petitioners assail the CA decision and resolution that upheld the constitutionality and validity of EO 97-
A, according to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 (“An
Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”)
were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic
Zone (SSEZ).
Respondent Court held that “there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section
12 of RA 7227. In both, the ‘Secured Area’ is precise and well-defined as ‘. . . the lands occupied by the Subic
Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'” The appellate court
concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the
same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the
“secured area” and not to include the “entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the
law.”
The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as being within the
prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its “avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest.” It
ruled that “EO 97-A merely implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227].”
Disagreeing, petitioners now seek before us a review of the aforecited Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution.
Issue: Won EO 97 A is violative of the equal protection clause
Ruling: YES. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. There are
real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval
Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.
8.18 Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC GR 132774 June 21 1999
Facts: Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were incumbent provincial or municipal officials in
Cagayan. Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 elections Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) in accordance with its own tenor or as modified by paragraph 3 of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436. Petitioners contend that the classification in Section 67 is not based on
substantial distinctions and, thus, violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Issue:WON the Section 67of the Omnibus Election Code is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
Ruling: Section 67 was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to the constitutional pronouncement that public
service is a public trust. Hence,it is not violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut short the term of
office of local officials. The situation that results with the application of Section 67 is covered by the term
voluntary renunciation.
8.19 De Guzman vs. COMELEC 336 SCRA
Facts: At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No.
8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996".
RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996
By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated
Resolution Nos. 97-0002[1] and 97-0610[2] for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued
several directives[3] reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different
stations.
Issue: WON SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION

Ruling: The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the
following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.[4]
After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies
the aforestated requirements.
8.20 People vs. Mercado GR 116239 Nov 29, 2000
Facts: The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and
sentencing them the punishment of death. The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the
alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors committed in convicting
the accused.
Issue: Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment.
Ruling: No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a
"cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against
the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are
established.
9.11 People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Issue: Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate
of the sovereign will”.
Ruling: No. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are varied. Here, election to the
position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
9.12 People v. Piedra 350 SCRA 163
Facts: Dela Piedra was charged with illegal recruitment in a large scale. In an information filed against her,
without any POEA license, she allegedly offered and promised for a fee employment in Singapore to Modesto,
Amanita and Timbol, such that Modesto had already advanced the amount of Php2,000.00. Dela Piedra was
arrested in her home after an investigation was made by Atty. Erlina Ramos, a lawyer of the POEA, who
pretended to be an applicant, which led to an entrapment operation of the PNP-CIS for Region IX.
Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the
constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the
LaborCode defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause. The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.
—(a) x x x.
(b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any

manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
Issue: Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, otherwise known as the illegal
recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause
Ruling: No. Dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is
void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. Due process requires that the terms of a penal
statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct ontheir part will render
them liable to its penalties. In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the
Supreme Court “criticized” the definition of “recruitment and placement.” The Court ruled, however, that her
reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the
crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only “whenever two or more persons are in any manner
promised or offered any employment for a fee.” In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that
would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court
was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and
drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13(b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act”
whose obscurity is evidenton its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise
language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.
9.13 International School v. Quisimbing June 1, 2000
Facts: Petitioners work under private respondent International School. The school hires both local and foreign
hires. Foreign hires are granted with more benefits and higher salary. Respondent says this is because of
dislocation factor and limited tenure. Petitioners contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and
local hires. They claim that it is discriminatory to Filipinos and it constitutes racial discrimination.
Issue: Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause
Held: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for equal work, persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility under similar conditions should be paid similar salaries. If
an employer accords the same rank and position, the presumption is that they perform equal work. Here, both
groups have similar functions which they perform under similar conditions. There is no evidence that foreign
hires perform 25% more efficient than local hires. The dislocation factor and tenure are properly accorded by
the benefits they received.
9.14 Central Bank Employees Assn. v. BSP 446 SCRA 29
Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and created the new BSP on 1993 through RA
No 7653. Central Bank Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II Sec 15(c). They
contend that it makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP
officers as exempt class of Salary Standardization Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-file non-exempt class.
BSP contends that the exemption of officers (Salary Grade 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address
the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended
to discriminate against the rank-and-file.
Issue: Whether or not contended proviso of RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence
unconstitutional
Ruling: Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee
status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater
benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive
higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary
standardization act as provided by the proviso.
9.15 Ycasuegi v. PAL 569 SCRA 467
Facts: Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL, herein respondent. Petitioner was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. Petitioner claims that he was
illegally dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed
Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause
guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of
private individuals. Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th Amendment, which is the source of

our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
equal protection guarantee
9.16 SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92
Facts: Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumboko sought
to compel respondent Lito L. Atienza, then Mayor of City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which
reclassified Pandacan area from industrial to commercial and redirected the owners and operators of disallowed
businesses to desist from operating their business. Among the disallowed businesses was the “Pandacan
Terminal” of the oil companies.
Cheveron, Petron, Shell and DOE question the validity and enforceability of Ordinance No. 8027 and contend
that it was superseded by Ordinance No. 8119 also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Ordinance of 2006.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is valid and enforceable
Ruling: Yes. Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027, we now
proceed to make a definitive ruling on its constitutionality and validity.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.
9.17 Gobenciong v. CA 550 SCRA 302
Facts: Dr. Pedro Gobenciong was Administrative Officer IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical
Center. He was charged and 3 other persons with Falsification of Public Document and Misconduct.
Gobenciong then sought reconsideration of this order, but without awaiting the Ombudsman’s action
thereon, Gobenciong filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA denied Gobenciong’s petition for certiorari on
the strength of Sec. 24 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which expressly empower the Ombudsman, under
defined conditions, to preventively suspend, for a maximum period of six months, all but three
categories of public officials and employees under investigation by his office and to direct the immediate
implementation of the corresponding suspension order. Ombudsman eventually found Gobenciong, et al guilty
of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposed a penalty of 1 year suspension
without pay. Gobenciong filed a motion for reconsideration, which Ombudsman denied, prompting
Gobenciong to appeal to the CA.
Issue: Whether RA 6770, on the ground of undue delegation of legislative authority and under the equal
protection clause, is unconstitutional?
Ruling: NO. The Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it
to carry out its mandate as protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in
the Government. They, however, left it to Congress to invest the office with more broad powers to enforce its
own action. Clearly then, the espoused theory of undue delegation of authority is untenable. For, in the ultimate
analysis, it is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed the grant by Congress of
sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman. Furthermore, the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible opportunity; this means before the Office of
the Ombudsman, or at least before the CA.
9.18 MIAA v. Olongapo 543 SCRA 269
Facts: OMSI (Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc) and TCSI (Triple Crown Services, Inc) were among the
five contractors of MIAA which had janitorial and maintenance service contracts covering various areas in the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Before their service contracts expired on October 31, 1998, the MIAA
Board of Directors, through Antonio P. Gana, then General Manager (GM) of MIAA, wrote OMSI and TCSI
informing them that their contracts would no longer be renewed after October 31, 1998.
OMSI and TCSI, in a letter to Gana, expressed its concern over the award of its concession area to a new
service contractor through a negotiated contract. It said that to award TCSIs contract by mere negotiation would
violate its right to equal protection of the law. TCSI thus suggested that a public bidding be conducted and that
the effectivity of its service contract be meanwhile extended until a winning bid is declared.

Consequently, OMSI and TCSI instituted civil cases against MIAA to forestall the termination of their contracts
and prevent MIAA from negotiating with other service contractors.
Issue: Whether the right of OMSI and TCSI to equal protection of the law was violated by MIAA
Ruling: According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional right of Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc.
(OMSI) and Triple Crown Services, Inc. (TCSI), the incumbent service contractors, to equal protection of the
law was violated by MIAA and its general manager when no public bidding was called precisely because the
latter were going to award the subject service contracts through negotiation. Worse, the Court continued, the
acts of MIAA and Gana smack of arbitrariness and discrimination as they not only did not call for the required
public bidding but also did not even accord OMSI and TCSI the opportunity to submit their proposals in a
public bidding
9.19 Nicolas v. Romulo 578 SCRA 438
Facts: On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was
convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman
convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But
pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith.
Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our
senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable,
precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully
complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US
Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be
immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing
legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing
legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.
9.20 League of Cities v. COMELEC 608 SCRA 636
Facts: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the
sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws),
and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the
subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck
down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate equal protection clause of the Constitution
HELD: Yes. The petition is meritorious. Cityhood Laws were declared unconstitutional. Substantial distinction
lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective
provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the
provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.
10.11 QUINTO VS. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied
the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE: Is the said COMELEC resolution valid?

1.11 20.20 (edited)

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