2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
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CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason. 2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya. 3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
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2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
- 1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project Update and Assessment October 18, 2016
- 2. 2 TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS 1. Iran may have facilitated at least two missile attacks from al Houthi-Saleh territory that targeted a U.S. Navy ship in the Red Sea. 2. Tripoli is on the verge of a security breakdown following an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). 3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region. 3 2 1
- 3. 3 | ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates Political and military tensions remain high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Indian security forces engaged in a three-day standoff with suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militants in Pampore, Jammu and Kashmir. Indian security forces issued a security alert warning that LeT militants may attempt to infiltrate the Punjab border. Pakistan-based Salafi- jihadi group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) urged the Pakistani government to allow jihadi organizations to participate in the Kashmir conflict. Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups in Pakistan and Kashmir will continue efforts to increase and legitimize their participation in the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan-based Salafi-jihadi groups will likely continue to target Indian security forces in order to demonstrate their capabilities and stake in the conflict. Pakistani security forces continued to crack down on militant groups following a call from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to improve counterterrorism operations. Pakistani forces conducted successful operations in Balochistan, in and around Karachi, and in Punjab. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan splinter group Jamatul Ahrar continues to actively target Pakistani security forces. Jamatul Ahrar gunmen killed three officers in Quetta, Balochistan Province. Outlook: Pakistan will continue to crack down on Salafi-jihadi organizations in order to deflect accusations of support for militant groups and de-escalate tensions in Kashmir.
- 4. 4 | ASSESSMENT: Political All major parties agreed to a 72-hour humanitarian ceasefire to begin on October 19. Political progress remains unlikely because no major parties have expressed willingness to modify their opposing political objectives. The al Houthi-Saleh faction’s participation in the ceasefire and its release of two American hostages to Oman on October 15 indicate that al Houthi-Saleh leadership seeks to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. following attacks on a U.S. Navy destroyer from al Houthi-Saleh territory. Outlook: Airstrikes and cross-border missiles attacks will decrease during the ceasefire, but local fighting will continue. Security Factions operating in al Houthi-Saleh territory may be attempting to increase regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi- Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason, a U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer, on October 9, October 12, and possibly October 15. The U.S. Navy targeted radar stations in al Houthi-Saleh territory with “limited self-defense strikes” on October 13 in response. A senior U.S. official said that the al Houthis were “unquestionably involved” in the attacks, but the operatives directly responsible for the missile launches remain unknown. Iran may have provided the missiles or facilitated the attacks, which advance Iranian strategic objectives in the region. Outlook: The missile capabilities of the al Houthi-Saleh faction and affiliated groups operating in Yemen will continue to threaten navigational freedom in the Bab al Mandab Strait, a key maritime chokepoint. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen AQAP militants continue to fight al Houthi-Saleh forces alongside tribal militias in southern Yemen. AQAP-affiliated Ansar al Sharia clashed with al Houthi-Saleh forces in al Bayda governorate and assassinated an al Houthi-Saleh field commander in Ibb governorate. AQAP strengthens its local ties by positioning itself against invading northern al Houthi-Saleh forces. Outlook: AQAP’s base of support may diminish when al Houthi-Saleh forces do not threaten historic South Yemen territory. GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
- 5. 5 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN 1) 12 OCT: Missiles targeted the USS Mason. 2) 10 OCT: AQAP clashed with al Houthi- Saleh forces in Rada’a, al Bayda. 3) 12 OCT: Hadi government forces seized positions in al Buqa’a city, Sa’ada. 4) 11 OCT: Al Houthi- Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward southern Saudi Arabia 5) 11 OCT: Al Houthi- Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Ma’rib governorate. 6) 13 OCT: The U.S. Navy struck missile sites at Ras Isa, Khokha, and Mokha. 2 3 5 4 1 6
- 6. 6 | ASSESSMENT: Political Somalia’s parliamentary election process is failing to meet international standards. Galmudug State elected a former warlord and top official from Mohamed Farah Aidid’s dictatorial regime, Abdi Quebydiid, to Somalia’s Upper House. The UN Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) urged officials to disallow Quebydiid’s candidacy. Multiple regions failed to produce candidate lists that met constitutional requirements. Lower House elections may be delayed beyond October 23. Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn expanded restrictions imposed by his October 8 State of Emergency declaration. The new restrictions limit foreign diplomats’ in-country movements and establish curfews in some areas. Outlook: Somalia’s election process will produce a legislature that includes warlords and will conclude in early 2017. Security Regional conflicts threaten the stability of Galmudug State. Clashes between Puntland and Galmudug security forces killed at least 11 security personnel and displaced thousands of civilians in Galkayo, the capital of Mudug region. Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), a Sufi Islamist paramilitary group, maintains control of Galgaduud region’s capital, Dhuusamareeb town, and drove Galmudug and Somali National Army (SNA) forces from Godinlabe town on October 12. Outlook: Clashes between armed groups will destabilize Galmudug state and may disrupt Lower House elections. Al Shabaab Al Shabaab militants are attempting to regain territory from African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) forces in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab temporarily occupied Muri town in Lower Shabelle region on October 16 and launched a second assault on the town on October 17. Al Shabaab and AMISOM forces also exchanged mortar fire near Qoryooley city in Lower Shabelle on October 11, 14, and 16. Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely challenge AMISOM forces for control of small towns but remains incapable of driving government forces from major urban centers. GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
- 7. 7 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA 1) 11-16 OCT: Al Shabaab and AMISOM forces exchanged mortar fire near Qoryooley, Lower Shabelle region. 2) 13 OCT: Al Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting regional security forces near Baidoa city. 3) 16 OCT: Al Shabaab militants temporarily seized Muri town, Lower Shabelle region. 4) 17 OCT: Suspected al Shabaab militants attacked the governor’s residence in Mandera County, Kenya. 4 2 3 1
- 8. 8 | ASSESSMENT: Political A failed attempt to overthrow the Government of National Accord (GNA) sparked clashes between GNA-allied militias and anti-GNA militias in Tripoli. The GNA has failed to provide the economic and governance benefits necessary to secure its hold on the capital. Anti-GNA Islamist politicians attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA assembly on October 14. The attempted coup undermines the UN-backed GNA’s efforts to strengthen its hold on Libya’s state institutions and counter the ascendant Libyan National Army (LNA), which controls eastern Libya. Outlook: The LNA may capitalize on the chaos in Tripoli by advancing further west. GNA Prime Minister Fayez al Serraj may also increase efforts to ally with the LNA, which may spark backlash from the GNA’s current supporters. Security Tripoli may be on the verge of a security breakdown. The Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB), a powerful Salafi militia that supports the anti-GNA coup, expanded its network of checkpoints throughout the capital after the coup. The TRB rivals the militias from Misrata that provide the bulk of the GNA’s military force. Rising tensions in Tripoli may draw Misratan forces away from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight in Sirte. Outlook: The redirection of Misratan militias from Sirte to Tripoli would help ISIS to regenerate in central Libya. Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya ISIS militants continue to operate throughout Sirte District after escaping the U.S.-backed siege on central Sirte city. GNA- allied militias discovered an ISIS headquarters in Manara district, southern Sirte city, indicating that ISIS cells continue to operate behind the current frontline. Outlook: The diffusion of ISIS militants outside of Sirte city will likely result in a months-long guerilla war throughout Sirte district. WEST AFRICA LIBYA
- 9. 9 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA 1) 14 OCT: Former GNC politicians occupied the State Council headquarters in Tripoli. 2) 14 OCT: GNA-allied militias severed an ISIS LOC in al Jiza, Sirte. 3) 14-16 OCT: The U.S. conducted 36 airstrikes in Sirte. 4) 16 OCT: GNA-allied militias and the TRB clashed in Tripoli. 5) 16 OCT: GNA-allied militiamen seized ISIS headquarters in Manara, Sirte. 6) 17 OCT: BRSC shelling killed three civilians in Sidi Hussein, Benghazi. 3 1 4 5 2 6
- 10. 10 | ASSESSMENT: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb ISIS in Algeria may return to its previous state of dormancy after suffering a quick retaliation from security forces. The Algerian military killed the emir of ISIS Wilayat Jaza’ir (Algeria) on October 13, shortly after the group’s first claimed attack since August 2016. Wilayat Jaza’ir has not confirmed its emir’s death. Algerian forces also killed a lieutenant of AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdel, who was responsible for the group’s financial operations, on October 9. Outlook: ISIS in Algeria will seek to preserve and develop its relationships with groups operating in cross-border safe havens in western Tunisia and Libya. Uqba ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia) The AQIM network in western Tunisia remains capable of attacking Tunisian security forces. Uqba ibn Nafa’a militants mobilized from mountain sanctuaries in order to conduct suicide attacks on military sites, according to Tunisian intelligence. Outlook: Uqba ibn Nafa’a will attempt to conduct an attack that it can leverage for propaganda and recruitment. Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram) The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) may be increasing attacks on Niger from a likely safe haven in neighboring Mali. Suspected MUJAO militants kidnapped an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. Suspected MUJAO militants also attempted to storm a Nigerien prison containing Salafi-jihadi militants on October 17. ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (WGI), a Boko Haram faction with close ties to ISIS, is trying to distance itself from rival Boko Haram factions. ISIS WGI released 21 of the Chibok school girls to the Nigerian government. ISIS WGI may be seeking popular support by releasing the girls, who symbolize rival Boko Haram leader Abu Bakr Shekau’s brutality. Outlook: AQIM-linked groups may escalate attacks on Niger, which hosts American, French, and German forces. ISIS WGI will attempt to position itself as more moderate than Shekau’s faction but will still adhere to ISIS’s violent ideology. WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL
- 11. 11 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB 1) 13 OCT: The Algerian Army killed the emir of ISIS Wilayat Jaza’ir in Oued Zhour, Skikda Province, Algeria. 2) 11-12 OCT: Spanish and Moroccan security forces arrested six Moroccan ISIS members throughout Spain and Morocco in a joint operation. 3) 17 OCT: The Moroccan Army arrested six Algerian Army officers and several Polisario Front militants in El Guerguerat, Western Sahara. 1 3 2
- 12. 12 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL 1) 17 OCT: Suspected MUJAO militants attacked a prison in Koutoukalé, Niamey Region, Niger. 2) 14 OCT: Suspected MUJAO militants killed two soldiers and kidnapped an American aid worker in Abalak, Tahoua Region, Niger. 3) 16 OCT: ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya attacked a joint Nigerian and Nigerien army encampment near Gashigar, Borno State, Nigeria. 2 3 1
- 13. 13 ACRONYMS African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA) Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA) Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Libyan National Army (LNA) Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD) National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) Pakistani Military (PakMil) Possible military dimensions (PMD) Somalia National Army (SNA) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- 14. 14 Katherine Zimmerman research manager katherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576 Paul Bucala Iran analyst paul.bucala@aei.org (202) 888-6573 Marie Donovan Iran analyst marie.donovan@aei.org (202) 888-6572 Heather Malacaria program manager heather.malacaria@aei.org (202) 888-6575 Emily Estelle al Qaeda analyst emily.estelle@aei.org (202) 888-6570 Caitlin Pendleton Iran analyst caitlin.pendleton@aei.org (202) 888-6577 For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org. Frederick W. Kagan director fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569