Lessons from Shimon Peres of Israel

Ashok Ogra
The ‘surgical strikes’ carried out by the Indian armed forces inside the Pakistan territory last week coincided with the death of the noted statesman and former Prime Minister & President of Israel, Shimon Peres.
His death was mourned by world leaders, and most leading dailies carried detailed obituaries of one of the founders of modern Israel. But most newspapers failed to acknowledge his role in counter- terrorist hostage- rescue mission(s). If the progenitor of the Zionist idea was Theodor Herzl (‘The Jewish State’, 1896), the credit for laying the foundations of a modern Israel state must go to its first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion.  While Gen. Moshe Dayan strengthened the armed forces to deal with Arab aggression since the inception of the new state in 1948, it was Shimon Peres who secured the state of Israel and it’s citizens from terror attacks both within the country and outside.
To fully appreciate the counter-insurgency strategist in Shimon Peres, let me first elaborate on the ‘Entebbe Operation’ of which he was the main architect, and one of the most difficult and high-risk hostage-rescue mission carried out thousands of miles away in an enemy country.
(One can recall two similar examples of successful counter insurgency operations of such scope and magnitude. In 1977, German counter insurgency commandos stormed the Lufthansa plane that had been hijacked by Palestine Liberation Organization militant group to Mogadishu, Somalia. All the 86 passengers were taken hostage for release of the terrorists held in Israeli captivity. The German Commandos neutralized all the terrorists and managed to get all the hostages released. Similarly, Abbottabad saw Osama bin Laden killed by special US forces military unit in May 2011.)
On June 27, 1976, AIR France flight flying from Tel Aviv to Paris was hijacked by four PLO terrorists, and after refueling at Benghazi, Libya the plane finally landed at Entebbe where they were joined by more PLO militants and by units of the Ugandan army. The hijackers demanded the release of 53 convicted terrorists held by Israel in exchange for the release of the hostages. Idi Amin, the mass murderer & an avowed enemy of Israel, was then the ruler of Uganda.
The policy adopted by Israel from the outset rejected any form of compromise with terrorism. Thus any compromise this time would have negated the stated policy stand. However, this time the government was under tremendous pressure from the public and from the families of the hostages.
During the cabinet meetings the then Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin seemed less enthusiastic about a rescue operation to be carried out by army troopers but it was the then Defence Minister, Shimon Peres who along with the Army Chief General Gur who convinced the Cabinet to carry out the surprise attack. There were those who gave it a 50-50 chance. However, almost all key players involved in the discussion agreed on one point – landing the first aircraft without arousing suspicion. If this was possible, then there was a high chance of success. And with luck there would be no causalities.
According to Shimon Peres “the tendency of terrorist groups to bedeck themselves with titles such as ‘Red Army’ or the ‘Liberation Organization’ should not beguile us or our often bewitched media……..
Terrorist groups should be described in their true colours – groups which are impatient with democracy, which are undisciplined, corrupt in their attitude towards life, and unable to free themselves from the domination of hatred and murder.”
Chaim Herzog, who rose to the position of President in mid 1980s, was one of the key middle-level players who took part in planning the ‘Operation Entebbe’. In his book ‘Arab-Isreali Wars,’ Chaim provides us with a detailed account that went into undertaking such a rescue operation:
“The General Staff laid down the general outline of the operation from the point of landing and allotted units and tasks. These would be:
* A force to illuminate and secure the runway.
*  A force to occupy the old terminal where hostages were taken and release them.
* A force to take control of the new terminal.
* A force to secure the airfield and destroy the Ugandan fighter aircraft.
* A force to evacuate the hostages from the terminal to the aircraft.
In the course of the planning and preparation, considerable use was made of the aerial photographs of the Entebbe airfield taken earlier by Israeli Air Force.”
It was also well known that Idi Amin would invariably travel in a Mercedes accompanied by a Land Rover. It was this that gave birth to the idea to look out for a Mercedes that would be used for deception purposes in the operation.
The other important lead was provided by the non-Jewish passengers who had earlier been released by the terrorists. The daily routine at the terminal was gathered: where they slept; where the various conveniences were located and how they reached home; what was the guard routine and in which rooms the terrorists lived; the nature of the terrorists and their behavior towards the hostages; the location of the Ugandan soldiers and their guard routine. Accordingly, mock exercises were carried out on a model.
The greatest challenge the Israeli armed forces faced was with regards to refueling the Lockheed C -130 Hercules aircraft they intended to deploy for carrying out the operation. The Israelis lacked the logistical capability to aerially refuel the aircraft. Most African nations did want to extend this facility for fear of earning the wrath of Idi Amin.
Also, there was this utmost need to keep the operation a top ‘secret’.
However, after several rounds of negotiations, the Kenyan government agreed to let Israeli Air Force use its base in Nairobi. Kenya has had Jewish population in mid 1970s. It was a highly influential group. It is they and few others who influenced the President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta to allow the refueling facility.
On the ultimate day, the four aircrafts were deployed to carry out the operation .These aircraft carried paratroopers, four armoured cars, a jeep, Mercedes car & a Land Rover, a medical team and a refueling team and other essential weaponry/ material.
On June 3,1976 after seven hours of flying over 4000 kms, the forces came within the range of the Entebbe control tower and the first aircraft landed at 11 pm (local time). The operation had been planned in a manner so that the first aircraft could dovetail behind a scheduled British cargo flight, thus arousing no suspicion.
The evacuation plan went off as planned. After the commencement of the operation, the first aircraft loaded with 102 hostages took off from Entebbe, and the entire rescue was completed in 53 minutes. And before leaving, the Israeli paratroopers destroyed the Ugandan Air Force MIGs stationed at the airport. While all the terrorists were eliminated, Israeli forces tragically lost 3 hostages in cross fire and Lt. Col Yonatan Netanyahu – the elder brother of the current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who is considered a ‘hardliner.’ The entire hostage drama lasted just seven days. Shimon Peres has in ‘Entebbe Diary’ published in 1997, described the details of the entire operation.
The operation at Entebbe was the culmination of years of training by the counter terrorist unit of the Israeli Army. All eventualities were thought out and planned.
Several Hollywood movies have been made on this incredible operation that celebrates Israeli intelligence & courage and Israeli idea of a nation.
A documentary titled ‘Operation Thunderbolt: The Entebbe Rescue Operation’ has also been made and is now available on YouTube.
(However, we need to remember that not all covert operations launched by the Israeli commandos have been completely successful. In 1974, the Israeli forces stormed the building in Ma’alot, a small town along the Galilee region, in the state of Israel, where the armed militants had taken scores of children hostage. While all the militants were eliminated but 22 Israeli children lost their lives).
According to Hoag Levins, author of ‘The Secret Wars Against Israel’, “the struggle for Israel to survive over the years of existence, while creating free, democratic society, must be one of the most intriguing, imaginative and encouraging stories of modern times.”
The question is whether India can achieve the same determination and sophistication, coordination and speed in dealing with terrorism sponsored from across the border?
Shimon Peres always emphasized on the need to establish an elaborate intelligence system and an early warning system with properly trained commandos in order to nullify the terrorist advantage of surprise & indiscriminate attack.
In the context of the Government of India yielding to the demands of the terrorists that resulted in the release of Rubiya Sayeed (1990) and Masood Azhar (1999), the current policy-makers and defence analysts may remind themselves of what Shimon had to say when faced with hostage crisis:”The heart wrenching question is whether we should risk the lives of innocent unarmed civilians, and save the future of this country, or not. If we surrender, the respect for terrorism will grow.”
Strangely though, same Shimon Peres who is credited with securing Israeli borders and its establishments across the world, spent years and years to pursue peace process with Arab neighbours –  Egypt & PLO, in particular – that earned him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 along with Yaseer Araft of PLO and the then Prime Minister of Israel Yitzak Rabin for reaching a peace agreement of what has come to be known as ‘Oslo Accord’.
Perhaps, the true legacy of Shimon Peres that India can emulate is to never surrender to terrorists/terrorism, and yet be open to pursue peace as an option. Shimon Peres exemplified the best acumen for combating techniques, despite being an unrelenting champion of peace. He strongly believed in building Israeli’s military might; he also wanted to enter history as a peacemaker.
“Israel is determined to bring an end to the violence and bring a beginning to peace” declared Shimon Peres.
However, unlike the Palestine issue, the peace process in the sub-continent is complicated, held hostage by Pakistan that is unwilling to give up its decades’ old policy of achieving its ends in Kashmir through a proxy war fought by the terrorists it trains, arms and helps in sneaking their way into Jammu & Kashmir. The resolution of the ‘Kashmir dispute’ is thus a ‘bogey’ used by Pakistan to keep the ‘pot boiling’.
This dilemma is best echoed by Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institute, USA: “The Uri event was by itself inconsequential. It could have been started by Pakistani ‘minders’ of the trouble-makers, or it could have begun on its own. The issue is not Kashmir, but the army’s peculiar attachment to it, highlighted by the rapture with which it is held. However, Pakistani officers now get the full shock of contact with the Pakistan Taliban. Certainly, most Pakistanis don’t want the achievement of a separate Kashmir, but they relish the idea of a troublesome state, controlled by India.”(October 4, 2016, Indian Express).
Indeed, take home lessons for India!
(The Author is a noted Management & Media professional, having served as Regional Director, Discovery Channel (South Asia) & is currently Director, Apeejay Institute of Mass Communication, Delhi.)
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