This story is from September 20, 2016

'Returning Poonch-Uri bulge to Pak a strategic mistake'

Fifty-one years after the 1965 war, army veterans feel that if strong political decisions were taken at that time, terrorist infiltration from Pakistan would have been reduced by more than 50 per cent.
'Returning Poonch-Uri bulge to Pak a strategic mistake'
MEERUT: Fifty-one years after the 1965 war, army veterans feel that if strong political decisions were taken at that time, terrorist infiltration from Pakistan would have been reduced by more than 50 per cent.
Remembering late Maj Ranbir Singh, who attained martyrdom while capturing a strategic peak near Haji Peer in September 1965, the war veterans in Meerut spoke exclusively with TOI about how after losing more than 50 men, the Indian Army captured a strategic bulge by establishing a straight link between Poonch and Uri.

According to the retired army commanders, Poonch and Uri sectors are only 40km apart but because of bulge, the distance becomes more than 450km. Soon after ceasefire on September 21, 1965, the won over territories from both sides were returned under the Tashkent agreement.
Maj Ranbir Singh belonged to 19 Punjab Regiment that played strategic role in capturing some of the highest peaks in Uri-Poonch bulge. The 19 Punjab Regiment is headquartered in Meerut.
During an exclusive interaction with TOI, Maj Gen (retd) J R Bhatti (who was adjutant, 19 Punjab Regiment in 1965), said, “The very purpose of going into that area in 1965 was to capture the entire bulge with a view to prevent Pakistani infiltration into Uri and Poonch sectors. In the operation from August 23 to September 21, 1965, the Indian forces from Poonch and Uri sliced through the bulge capturing high altitude strategic peaks earlier controlled by Pakistani forces. This gave us a huge advantage of not only securing the Uri sector from the frequent onslaught of Pakistan-sponsored terrorists but also gave us the advantage of keeping an eye onto Hajira valley in PoK. But all that was lost when our political leadership succumbed to the Russian pressure in Tashkent. It was a blunder we committed that time and that continues to hound us till date.”

According to Army sources, the decision had two major implications. First, it gave a moral boost to Pakistan and it began to think that the area rightfully belonged to it and was no longer disputed. Second, Pakistan again allowed extremists to venture into Shopian, Gulbarg, Srinagar, Uri easily. Since then southern Kashmir has been vulnerable to attacks and because of dense jungles on the line of control, no amount of Indian troops can make check infiltration of terrorists.
“Because of that mistake, today Pakistan still has control of the higher peaks that we had won in 1965 giving them advantage over our control of the lower heights,” said Bhatti.
“Uri sector is at 4,500 ft above the sea level and is the lowest in the mountainous ridge. As a result, the route from PoK capital Muzaffarabad to Kashmir valley is less treacherous. Because of easy accessibility, it is also the favourite route of Pakistan-sponsored terrorists because of the simple reason that high altitude peaks like Gittiyan, Chakoti, Bidori, etc are strongly held by the Pakistan army and their surveillance can provide these terrorists a safe passage into Uri without being detected by Indian forces,” says Col (retd) Satyender Nath, who was a company commander at the time of capturing the Haji Pir pass in 1965.
According to sources in the army, a combination of 19 Punjab Regiment, 6 Dogra Regiment, 161 Infantry Brigade, 1st battalion of Parachute Regiment, 68 Armoured Regiment at all the strategic peaks like Bidori, Kiran, Ziyarat, Gittiyan, Haji Pir, etc had completely wiped out the presence of Pakistani forces in the region. With these strategic points in control Muzaffarabad-Punj-Haji Pir-Uri-Baramulla-Pattan-Srinagar route would be safe.
Bhatti, who spent 11 years of his career in the region, further states, “The Uri base where terror attack happened on Sunday is the most vulnerable section as it is just 4 km from the LoC. The militants had once again taken advantage of the dense forest and sneaked into Jalawan village to gain access to the base. If we had not surrendered the conquered territories in 1965, the LOC would have been shifted to at least 15km away."
The army veterans also feel that the recent unrest in the Kashmir valley is the result of inept handling of the situation by politicians. “Military intervention can only stabilize the situation for a short time; it cannot be a permanent solution. The government needs to find a viable political solution to end the crisis," said Nath.
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About the Author
Sandeep Rai

Sandeep Rai is a veteran journalist with two decades of experience in the reporting field. He heads the Western Uttar Pradesh bureau, managing Meerut, Bareilly & Agra circles. His areas of interest are wildlife, politics and special reportage.

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