At sea over China

G Parthasarathy

AS China’s military and economic presence in Myanmar grew following the military crackdown in 1988, concerns arose in India, about the possibility of Chinese military bases and surveillance facilities in Myanmar’s Cocos Island, bordering the Andaman Islands. A Chinese military analyst responded to such Indian concerns by arrogantly asserting: “The Indian Ocean is not India’s Ocean!” India had never asserted that it had territorial claims in the Indian Ocean. One of its most remarkable diplomatic achievements has been that it has settled its maritime boundaries with all its eastern neighbours. This was done not only with bilateral agreements on the maritime boundaries with Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and Bangladesh, but also tripartite agreements to determine tri-junctions, with Myanmar and Thailand, Indonesia and Thailand and Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

Unlike India, which settled maritime boundary issues in accordance with international law, China saw vast benefit, as early as 1947, in augmenting its access to huge oil and fishery resources by expanding its maritime frontiers, especially in the South China Sea. It claimed that its maritime frontiers historically lay on a “nine- dash line” across the South China Sea. As China grew militarily stronger, it enforced its maritime boundary claims, converting rocks into islands, while utilising its naval power coercively. A typical case of Chinese bullying was its use of force to fulfil its claims on the Scarborough Shoal, located 500 miles from its shores and barely 100 miles from the Philippines. Worse still, Beijing sought to exercise sovereignty over the entire South China Sea by issuing threats to passing naval vessels and seeking to enforce an “air defence identification zone”, requiring foreign aircraft to identify themselves even when on international waters.

Blinded by arrogance at its growing military power, China has sought to challenge Japanese sovereignty in the East China Sea by air space violations and its navy adopting provocative postures. This was, and remains, a real flashpoint, as the US-Japanese Security Treaty contains an American guarantee to protect Japanese sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Chinese actions have forced the Americans to respond, with submarines and aircraft carriers challenging Chinese claims in both the South China and East China Seas. China resorted to 570 air space violations across the Senkaku Islands in 2015. China today has maritime disputes with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. It was the Philippines that called China’s bluff and challenged its claims at the International Arbitration Tribunal, set up under the UN Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Even as China argued why India could not be admitted into the NSG, the international tribunal, whose verdict is binding, delivered China a resounding admonition.

It categorically held that there was no legal basis for any Chinese “historic rights” within its unilaterally imposed “nine-dash line”. It rejected China’s claims on several rocks and barren islets to expand its maritime frontiers, as they were not islands as defined in the UNCLOS. This meant that China had no legal basis to claim sovereignty, or fishing rights across the Spratly Islands, including the most contentious Scarborough Shoal and the Mischief Reef, where China had sought to construct an artificial island. While rejecting the verdict, China adopted a belligerent posture, with its navy resorting to a show of force. Predictably, the US and Australia welcomed the verdict and called on China to comply, even though the US is not a signatory to the UNCLOS and settles it maritime disputes bilaterally. China has, however, clearly placed itself as a regional bully, with its pretensions of being a benign power shattered.

It is clear that despite this victory on the rejection of China’s claims on its maritime boundaries, its affected neighbours have been restrained in their reactions. Nobody wishes to face the wrath of the wounded Dragon. Even the Philippines pledged itself to a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Moreover, even though five of the 10 ASEAN members face belligerent Chinese maritime boundary claims, others like Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia have made it clear that they are too dependent on China to cause it offence on this issue. The call across the ASEAN states, even by the Philippines and Vietnam, was for “restraint” in responding to the judgment.

China, in turn, has come out with a white paper, indicating some flexibility in its approach. China did not reassert its “historic rights” over the whole area of the nine-dash line. The language used in the Chinese text appears to suggest that the tribunal’s judgment that the Spratly Islands are “rocks incapable of sustaining human habitation” has not been directly contradicted by China. There are suggestions in the white paper that China could move towards modifying some of its claims, in negotiations with parties like Vietnam. Just a few days prior to the judgment, the Chinese government mouthpiece Global Times made a distinctly positive reference to Vietnam, stating: “China and Vietnam will have more common ground to address their bilateral territorial disputes, which will transform the landscape in the region.” Global Times suggested: “Hanoi’s strategic purpose is to defend what it holds and legalise oil drilling in the waters it occupies. It won’t provoke China if there is no major threat.” China earlier objected to oil drilling in these waters.

India should study these developments carefully. They signal a Chinese approach of splitting territorial claimants. Around 50 per cent of India’s global trade traverses the South China Sea. New Delhi has a vital interest in seeing that China does not have a legal basis to interrupt its freedom of navigation and over-flight rights in the South China Sea. Its statement after the verdict speaks of “self-restraint”, but also clearly reflects its concerns by urging all parties to respect the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the verdict. China is using its national power to establish its hegemony along its immediate sea-lanes, even as it steps up its presence across the Indian Ocean. Managing this assertiveness will require imaginative diplomacy in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. This would involve steps to establish a viable and stable balance of power in the entire Indo-Pacific region, working with partners like the US, Japan, Australia, Vietnam and others, while keeping channels of dialogue with Beijing open.