‘War-gaming’ at play to avert incursion

Ajay Banerjee 

“War-gaming” is an art of predicting a future outcome of military postures. An assessment done along the sensitive and strategically vital eastern Ladakh region predicts that armies of both nations — India and China — can at best advance 10-12 km into one another’s territory in case of a war.

Eastern Ladakh, part of Jammu and Kashmir, shares 826-km frontier with China and is geographically defined as the area from Karakoram Pass in the north to Demchok in the south-east.

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A “war-gamed” eastern Ladakh — a land of barren tree-less landscape dotted with high mountains and equally high passes — has been virtually militarily “tailored” to prevent a repeat of 1962 — when China, with a few exceptions, literally overran the Indian military defences.

An Indian assessment says despite Chinese People Liberation Army’s (PLA) numerical superiority and military strength (20 lakh soldiers backed by long-range missiles), it can be “stopped”.

This includes a method of getting real-time updates on Chinese movements; countering their patrols along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) — the de facto border — with own patrols; maintaining a minimum level of firepower and future stationing of fighter jets at Leh, the key air base in Ladakh.

The Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) have been tasked with conducting joint patrols along the LAC at 65 designated points, identified by the high-power China Study Group.

Key points of differing perception along the LAC include the Pangong Tso, a 135 km-wide glacial-melt lake which straddles both countries. It has boat patrols from either side.

Major Abhishek Singh, in charge of boat patrols in India, says “both sides on coming face-to-face maintain a distance of 25-30 feet”. A stand-off asking each other to back off can last a few minutes to about an hour, he says.

The sub-sector north (SSN) that includes the Depsang plains at 18,000 feet and also the areas abutting the Aksai Chin and Galwan are among the other flashpoints.

The latest Indian stance along the LAC is not akin to Jawaharlal Nehru’s failed 1960-1961 “forward policy”, but it mandates holding claims line along the LAC.

The “forward policy”, as explained by Neville Maxwell in his acclaimed book “India’s China war”, entailed taking up permanent positions along the high ridgelines of eastern Ladakh as per India’s unilaterally decided boundary of 1954. The latest Indian positions are more in line with maintaining the sanctity of the LAC.

All this is backed by political agreements at the top political level to ensure that no bullet is fired. The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) inked in October 2013 disallows night patrolling by either side.

The April 2005 protocol, termed as the “protocol on modalities for implementation of Confidence building measures (CBMs) in the military field along the LAC in the India-China border areas”, mandates soldiers of either side to show a banner with a slogan painted across. The banner primarily cites the 2005 agreement and says there is a need to back off from the present positions of patrolling.

Around 150 “banner drills” are conducted annually as both sides hold on to peace.

(To be concluded)