Ashton Carter pushes India-US strategic partnership, but does India have the will?

By Syed Ata Hasnain
Ashton Carter’s ongoing visit to India has elicited much interest. As a pro-active and India-focussed defence secretary, he has definitely striven to take the India-US strategic partnership to a higher level. Joining the dots of recent history, it was President George Bush who recognised the value of a strategic linkage with India and commenced the process of giving it substance early in his second term. The India-US nuclear deal, setting the stage for the strategic dialogue, was first negotiated in 2005.

Carter comes to New Delhi in the backdrop of introduction of a bill in US Congress to coordinate with India on an annual basis to develop military contingency plans for addressing threats to mutual security interests of both countries. The bill also calls for developing strategic operation capabilities.

It has been a quarter century since the end of the Cold War and a little over a decade since the Bush initiative of 2005. Examining convergence of interests and identification of threats has been an ongoing exercise resulting in different levels of joint training and cooperation. With the conceptualisation and now the execution of Act East policy of the Indian government, India is focussing increasingly on the Indo-Pacific region, which the US would also like to encourage.

While the right noises are being made in the politico-diplomatic realm of the relationship, how much of this is translating into greater understanding in the military-strategic domain is questionable. There are some constraints which must be looked at pragmatically.

Capacity becomes the constraining factor in such strategic relationships. However, the classic perception of capacity looks at it mainly from the angle of kinetic operations. It needs to be considered more holistically here.

It would include strategic stamina, political will, and diplomatic capability to maintain equilibrium in relationships, logistics capability and the existence of a scientific temper to absorb new technologies. It would also mean the conceptualising of doctrines for war fighting and maintenance of stability in a No War No Peace scenario. This would be a tall order for a nation which has yet to publish a single paper on its national security strategy.

The US strategic community is robust and always ahead in the doctrinal lexicon of war of words, terminologies and catch phrases which take its partners some years to understand, absorb and act upon. The length of such partnerships and growth of generations of leaders at tactical, operational and strategic levels through contingencies involving political gamesmanship, posturing and operations other than war prepare partners to be effective participants of the deep linkages which such relationships bring with them.

Much is dependent on trust which also arises from convergence of strategic thinking, stamina and intent to play it through. International strategic partnerships endure only if all the ingredients are present. Is there such a situation in the current dispensation of the India-US strategic partnership?

This is highly questionable although the dots of intent may all be there. History and generational growth sometimes bestow elements which act as constraints rather than binders.

(Syed Ata Hasnain is a retired Lieutenant General in the Indian Army.)