The tragic death of 10 Indian soldiers in February on the Siachen Glacier has once again drawn attention to the world’s highest battlefield. In April 2012, 138 Pakistani soldiers had also died in an avalanche in Siachen. The then Chief of the Pakistani Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani stated that India and Pakistan must live in peaceful co-existence as defence without development is neither viable nor acceptable. However, he had added an expected caveat stating, “everyone knows why the Army is here... because in 1984, the Indian Army occupied the area and in response to that the Pakistan Army was sent in”. In the context of this assertion, it may be worthwhile to examine the historical genesis of this dispute.
The first question that needs to be answered is: What was the position on and off the glacier prior to 1984 when Indian troops moved in pre-emptively to foil a Pakistani attempt to occupy Siachen? The crucial date for determining that is July 29, 1949, when a ceasefire agreement was signed in Karachi by ranking military representatives of India and Pakistan and the UN Military Observer Group.
A meeting was held in Karachi from July 18-27, 1949, to establish “a ceasefire line” (CFL) in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Major-General W.J. Cawthorn, Major-General Nazir Ahmad, Brigadier Sher Khan and some observers represented Pakistan at the Karachi Conference. On behalf of India Lieutenant-General S.M. Shrinagesh, Major-General K.S. Thimayya, Brigadier Sam Manekshaw, with H.M. Patel and Vishnu Sahay as observers participated. The ceasefire line delineated and demarcated the lines separating the two sides following the pause in hostilities in Jammu and Kashmir under auspices of the United Nations on January 1, 1949.
The July 29 Karachi Agreement delimited the entire ceasefire line defining over 740 km on the ground. Where then did the northern-most fringe of the ceasefire line lie? When the line started running through high mountains and glaciated areas as it panned north, it habitually started following an indicative route in the absence of clear landmarks on the ground. Its two penultimate and then the final benchmark became “Chalunka (on the Shyok River), Khor, thence North to the glaciers” transiting through grid reference NJ 9842.
However, the delineation of the northern-most segment of the ceasefire line was definite: NJ 9842, “thence north to the glaciers”. If every one of 30 or more earlier directional commands were fastidiously followed in tracing the ceasefire line, there was no reason whatsoever for any departure from this norm in the case of the very last markers. “Thence North”, could only mean due north to wherever the boundary of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir state lay. The Karachi Agreement directed that “the ceasefire line described above” be drawn “so as to eliminate any no man’s land”.
The ceasefire line was ratified by both sides and placed with the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan. It was revalidated as the Line of Control (LoC) by the Suchetgarh Agreement of December 1972, in accordance with the explicit intention of the Simla Conference earlier that year to move from a military conflict towards a political solution in Jammu and Kashmir. The LoC assimilated military advances made by either side in Jammu and Kashmir in the 1971 war. Thus, in the Kargil-Siachen sector, all territorial gains went entirely to India which acquired the 254 square mile Turtok salient, comprising five villages (Chalunka, Thang, Tyakshi, Pharol and Turtok) just south and west of NJ 9842.
This modest but vital military acquirement provided India a supplementary territorial defence against hostile cartographic or physical claims on Siachen. Thus, there was a CFL that was established in 1949 that after the Simla Agreement morphed into the LoC. After 1984, as India acquired tactical dominance of the area it established an Actual Ground Position line (AGPL) that outlines its physical presence on the ground today. That has been the progression in defining India’s borders in its northern-most reaches.
Therefore, to interpret NJ 9842, thence north to the glaciers, as meaning northeast as the Pakistanis do is to give up the accuracy of the Karachi/Suchetgarh Agree-ments for any one of the many subjective interpretations that can then be given to this operative phrase. Historic realities cannot be sacrificed at the altar of strategic fantasies of General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. Pakistan consistently insists that “north” here really means northeast to the Karakoram Pass.
All United Nations global and even Pakistani maps illustrated the CFL objectively and properly till approximately 1964-72. However, between 1964 and 1972, the US defence mapping agency, a global benchmark for cartography, began depicting the CFL as extending from NJ 9842 to a point just west of the Karakoram Pass. This emboldened Pakistan to commence to eastward a creep on their atlases also.
World atlases followed suit, portraying the line drawn from NJ 9842 northeast to the Karakoram Pass as the authentic and internationally accepted CFL-LoC, backed by mountaineering legends. India unfortunately did little to rebut or put in context. Pakistan appreciatively accepted these counterfeit universal testimonials and thereafter initiated moves to occupy Siachen.
Precisely what motivated this cartographic (and from the Indian point of view, disconcerting) aggression is not clear. Incontrovertibly backing these moves were specious depictions of the CFL-LoC on some authoritative maps produced by instrumentalities of the US administration.
Under these circumstances, any unreserved relocation from the Siachen glacier without affirming the precise delimitation of the CFL-LoC from NJ 9842 “thence north to the glaciers”, will mean accepting the Pakistan claim and throwing the August 1948 UN Resolution and derivative 1949 Karachi Agreement into the dustbin. This omnibus resolution on Jammu and Kashmir explicitly establishes Pakistan as the antagonist and trespasser. It necessitated that Pakistan’s military regiments and tribal irregulars to leave the state forthwith, and upheld India’s de jure sovereignty over the entire state even while preparations were made for a plebiscite.
The only lasting solution to this impasse in Siachen that is needlessly costing human lives is to get the LoC firmly anchored to a northern terminus. If it continues to dangle loosely creating contested zones open to subjective interpretation, it will always remain a source of conflict and confrontation. The glacier would see an augmentation of military presence rather than the other way around.
The only way forward is, therefore, the mutual authentication of the AGPL on established cartographic principles outlined earlier. This should be merged with a covenant on a correct interpretation of “NJ 9842 thence north to the glaciers” leaving no room for creating any no man’s land thus clearly marking a firm boundary running from NJ 9842 thence north to the glaciers. That is the only starting point of any substantive dialogue with Pakistan for disengagement, relocation and the eventual demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier that is in the interests of both the nations. Would Pakistan bite the bullet?
