Siachen: Calls for retreat undermine strategic relevance

‘Siachen’ means a ‘wild rose.’ Yes, the Nubra valley is full of shrubs bearing these small pink and white roses, so dense in their flowering that it is difficult to spot the leaves. But lurking between them are thick, firm and sharp thorns that seem to be representative of the conflict on the Siachen Glacier – prickly, harsh and intractable. What started as naiveté on the part of cartographers of the Karachi Agreement of 1949, where-in they stopped the demarcation of the cease fire line at Point NJ9842, thinking that no one would be foolish to lay claim to the wilderness ‘thence north to the glaciers,’ the conflict on the highest battlefield in the world has crossed three decades. A ceasefire is in place since 2003 but loss of life due the extremely harsh terrain and weather conditions continues. The death of soldiers of the Madras Regiment due an avalanche has re-kindled the debate about the ‘futility’ of the Siachen conflict, with the peaceniks renewing their call for a settlement between India and Pakistan.

The ‘cartographic aggression’ by Pakistan in permitting foreigners to explore the Glacier from its side, resulting in the area being shown as Pak-owned in Western maps, resulted in a riposte from India in 1978; Col Narendra Kumar led an expedition that climbed Teram Kangri II peak on the glacier. The Indian Air Force (IAF) gave helicopter support to the expedition and the first landing on the Glacier, with the author as a co-pilot, took place on 06 October 1978 when a Chetak helicopter brought back two casualties from what is now ‘Kumar’ post. Expeditions from both sides continued during summers of the ensuing years and India pre-empted a Pak plan to occupy heights on the Glacier in April 1984 by moving troops by helicopters to two strategic passes, Bilafond La and Sia La on 13 and 17 April. Thus commenced Op Meghdoot, the longest continuing one, in independent India’s history.

The harsh realism of Siachen operations have been brought out in stark reality due the avalanche tragedy. Here, records of resilience and fortitude are set everyday, exemplified by the sheer grit, will power, and of course God’s benevolence, that Lance Naik Hanamanthappa’s rescue showed after six days of internment 25 feet below the ice cap in temperatures that would have been below -45 degrees Celsius! One can also add that it suggests that God is Indian – but when one considers events on ground it’s the Army jawan who is holding fort. After a strict aclimatisation process that lasts many weeks, a battalion goes for a glacier deployment for three continuous months. Almost a thousand soldiers have lost their lives, the majority due environment related factors. The IAF has been shoulder to shoulder with the Army in air maintaining them, and a thread amongst helicopter pilots is that a tenure of Glacier flying is a must to become a true chopper jock. There have been many helicopter accidents, as the machines fly at the extremes of their flying envelope, carrying out multiple landings at 20,000 feet on a daily basis. The camaraderie between the Olive Greens and the Blues on the Glacier is to be seen to be believed.

But is it worth it, all this loss of life on both sides for what Stephen Cohen has termed, “two bald men fighting over a comb?” Yes it is, and this author responded in an opinion piece that, “..if the head is Indian, albeit bald, we still have a duty to protect.”

The incursion into Siachen Glacier was Pakistan’s doing; the motive was ulterior and the aim was to legitimize its claim through a de facto international acceptance. With the ceding of the Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963, the construction of the Karakoram highway close to the Glacier and now the start of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, wherein Chinese personnel would be positioned, Siachen is imbued with vital strategic relevance to the security of the Nubra and Shyok Valleys as also Ladakh. The Indian Army occupies all vantage heights on the ingress routes to the Glacier and its withdrawal to lower areas, with an assurance from Pakistan that it would not move into the heights, is fraught with danger. The Pak Army is against any accord that forces it to concede on paper that it is positioned well west of the Saltoro Range and cannot be trusted with just an assurance, as events have proven over the years. Presumably, an accord had almost been reached in 1987 on similar lines when Zia-ul-Haq was the President of Pakistan; however, Zia was killed in a mysterious plane crash, which Mr AK Verma, the former RAW Chief, has said was linked to the growing disenchantment of the Pak Generals with the deal.

Successive Pakistani civilian and military leaders have said that Kashmir is Pakistan’s jugular, so it is indeed intriguing why an attempt at a selective solution to Siachen is being advanced; there are other issues like Sir Creek too and hence such a ‘segmented’ resolution should be rejected. Environmentalists have suggested that Siachen be made into an ‘environment park,’ but there are tens of other such pristine areas that can be conferred this title. A reality is that, over the years, the casualties on the Glacier due nature have come down drastically – and so have fatalities during operational activities due to fine tuning of procedures. India should not be coerced by peaceniks into reaching an agreement that threatens its security. History shows that a country claiming to be a regional power has to make sacrifices of men and material if it wants to retain that status.

The Indian Army, the IAF, and indeed the nation have made countless sacrifices over the years over a piece of land that is rightfully ours. While every life is precious, let us not self-coerce ourselves due perceived excessive losses. To regain the commanding heights of the Saltoro Range after withdrawing from them would be next to impossible. Lance Naik Hanumanthappa has shown the way with his grit and a steely resolve on the hostile mountains of Siachen that India has more than enough resilience to face adversity.

(The author, a retired Air Vice Marshal, is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi).

About the Author Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur, retired from the Indian Air Force after 36 years of distinguished service. He is an Experimental Test Pilot from the French Test Pilots School, a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, USA and a post graduate in Defence and Strategic Studies from Madras University. He has commanded a frontline Helicopter Unit and two Flying Bases, was the Contingent Cdr of the first IAF United Nations Mission in Sudan and has been Head of Training (Air) at Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. As Asst Chief of Air Staff, the author was the operational head of Transport and Helicopter Operations of the Indian Air Force for two and a half years. His last assignment was as Asst Chief of Integrated Defence Staff in-charge of perspective planning and force structure of the Services. He writes for leading national newspapers and professional journals and his core interests concern Air Power and Strategic Affairs. He is presently working on his book ‘Coercion and Air Power.’

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