1965 battle: A war of perceptions India won

The India-Pakistan war of 1965 was also a war of perceptions.
India, while defending its territory from Pakistani aggression, also had to slew its inner demons (like the memory of the 1962 debacle) to take the fight to the enemy’s doorstep. India’s new victory narrative may be debatable, but the country undoubtedly was successful in 1965 in fighting off the perception that it was a passive state with a passive military.
Yet all of it didn’t happen in a flash; there was a lot of legwork that was done to boost the morale of the Indian Army, especially after its poor show against Pakistan in the latter’s Kutch offensive. The then army chief, general J N Chaudhury, is rarely given any credit for his leadership in that war but it was he who had realized the need to seize the initiative from the Pakistanis. As a result, on the intervening night of May 16 and 17 at Kargil, 34 years before a conflict there redefined Indo-Pak relations in 1999, two companies of the 4th battalion, Rajput Regiment, surprised and overwhelmed the Pakistanis perched on top of Black Rocks and Point 13620—two commanding heights from where Pakistan’s Karakoram Scouts had been firing on the Srinagar-Leh Road.
The Rajputs won the day, but lost their company commander who was given the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. Yet the significance of this operation was lost to the Pakistanis — that the Indians wouldn’t remain passive defenders.

Indian army officers with a captured Pakistani tank.
Military historian Mandeep Singh Bajwa, whose father General (then Colonel) K S Bajwa of the artillery had given fire support to the Rajputs, believes this was a pivotal moment. “When the Pakistanis launched Operation Gibraltar (sending infiltrators into Kashmir) in August, India once again quickly countered by capturing the ‘jumping points’ through which these infiltrations were done—Hajipir Pass is the more famous one now. India also conducted covert and overt ops across the Ceasefire Line (precursor of the LOC) and the Pakistanis knew about it. Yet they weren’t alarmed. Later, when they had intel from two trustworthy sources about India’s plans for launching a counter-offensive on September 6 across the Radcliffe Line, they chose to rubbish it, believing that the ‘dhoti prasads’ (a pejorative term used by Pakistanis for then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri and his generals) were incapable of such action,” Bajwa said.
When India did cross the international border, it wasn’t all too rosy for us. Pakistan had superior armour, guns and aircraft, and as troops on the ground soon found out, even better maps. Yet the grit and determination of the Indian troops eventually prevailed. Major General A J S Sandhu (Retd), who joined the Regiment of Artillery two years after the war, agrees with Bajwa. He believes Indian boots on the ground actually surmounted ominous odds to win this war of perceptions. “My father Lt Col Jaswant Singh was the CO of 7 Punjab. His battalion was tasked with the capture of the Ichhogil Canal, the Bhaini Dhilwal Bridge, and two Pakistani villages Ichhogil Hithar and Ichhogil Uttar. The bridge was first occupied by 1 Jat on September 6, but the Pakistanis retook it the same day. Then 6 Kumaon took it again at night, but was thrown back the next day. Again, 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon tried to capture it on September 7 and 8, but were unsuccessful and suffered heavy casualties. That’s when 7 Punjab was deployed on September 12,” Sandhu said.
The A and C companies occupied the two villages on September 12 and 13, and beat back all counter attacks by the Pakistanis. The Bhaini Dhilwal Bridge and the Ichhogil Canal were captured on September 16. Pakistan couldn’t recapture them throughout the war. “The battalion won 42 gallantry awards—a record in the war, and my father won a VSM. In fact, the Western Army commander Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, along with the corps and divisional commanders, visited 7 Punjab on September 23 (a day after the ceasefire) to personally congratulate the battalion on its excellent performance. Yet this action is never talked about as the focus remains on Dograi, Barki, Phillora, Asal Uttar and other more popular battles. The Indian Army prevailed despite ominous odds; we need to remember that,” general Sandhu said.
Bajwa believes there were many such gallant actions even though the Indian armed forces didn’t have strategic objectives. “This war was important because we learnt from our mistakes and in 1971 we achieved the strategic objectives we had set for us. That’s why 1971 was such a resounding victory. General Chaudhury deserves applaud because he rebuilt the army after the 1962 debacle, and his good example was followed by his successors — general P P Kumaramangalam and general (later field marshal) Sam Manekshaw,” he said.
It may not be wrong to say that 1965 actually helped India bury its ghosts, but raised new demons for Pakistan.