NRM delegates fooled as both Mbabazi and Museveni win

The much hyped NRM delegates’ conference last week at Mandela National Stadium at Namboole ended the way it had been purposed to end. That is to cleanse Amama Mbabazi as President Museveni gets his wish to rule uninterrupted.

Here is the story. The former prime minister had served President Museveni methodically. In the pursuit of Museveni’s success, Mr Mbabazi did everything possible both within and outside of the law. The bond between them puzzled many.

Mr Mbabazi was in effect the de facto vice president with access to the presidential jet as and when he needed it. As prime minister, he in fact chaired Cabinet meetings in spite of the presence of the vice president.

All the power with exception of commanding the army (the army is the life and blood of Mr Museveni) was open to Mr Mbabazi.

A story of how he used that power to diminish if not extinguish the political careers of other senior leaders within NRM is an old story—the political cemetery is full of graves. This exposure to power, in some quarters, exposed Mr Mbabazi as limited in collegial relations. He focused on upward political accountability (to the boss) and paid limited attention to downward accountability (the masses).

But as sages have said before, the wine of power is so sweet that once you start sipping it, you always want the glass full; you will not even tell when it has eroded your stability until you drop. So they say Mr Mbabazi set his eyes on the ultimate job-the presidency. He has not openly declared but his signals point to that. Some say Mr Museveni actually gave him the initial impetus which caused Mr Mbabazi to start mobilisation.

He apparently started building campaign cells locally and solicited international networks notably in China and United Arab Emirates (UAE).

But he had trusted on a difficult man—Museveni. When it became apparent that Mr Mbabazi was in for the job, Mr Museveni got down to work. He found it difficult to tell Mr Mbabazi that he should not stand because he had earlier given him the spur.

President Museveni, aware of Mr Mbabazi’s troubles within the party, crafted a team to demand that he stands as sole candidate. The move came from unlikely quarters, the young MPs: Peter Ogwang, Evelyn Anite, Aggrey Bagiire and Dr Kenneth Omona, among others.

All of whom were not from western region, the President’s home area. It was also a strategic choice. They were clandestinely backed by Special Forces Command (SFC) providing them with security and intelligence. They would also directly report to the President.

They also spied on fellow MPs and ministers to know who was in support of Mr Mbabazi.

First-hand information
A team of youthful activists were approached to join Mr Mbabazi’s camp. Their duty was to understand the actual tricks that Mr Mbabazi would use. Mr Museveni feared his former premier’s methods, so he needed first-hand information.

Most of these youth were given private mobile phones which would only be used to receive the President’s calls and not any other. They were also coached to be vocal.

When the Mbabazi group bought laptops and handed them to their campaign team, most of those computers were handed to SFC to establish their source and programming. Those who gave the laptops to SFC were paid Shs10 million each. The laptops were later returned to them to continue with Mr Mbabazi’s work while SFC picked all the communication.

The civil society activists suspected to be sympathetic to Mbabazi were carefully dealt with starting with infiltration. The police officers who were sympathetic to Mr Mbabazi found themselves with uninspiring deployments as Gen Kale Kayihura, the Inspector General of Police and an unapologetic believer in President Museveni, cracked the whip. The army officers suspected to have been in cahoots with the prime minister, were relegated to less influential deployments.

Once the mood for sole candidature built momentum, the Kyankwanzi retreat was called to make it clear to Mr Mbabazi and others that the old man was still needed even if he did not “want” to stand again. It was also meant to send a message to those who had believed that Mr Mbabazi was next, that they would rather know Mzee is still around and either decide to stick to Mbabazi and perish or decamp early.

That is how Mr Mbabazi’s camp was set into confusion. At the international stage, Foreign Affairs minister Sam Kutesa was dismantling Mr Mbabazi’s networks. There was also a rearrangement of diplomats in foreign missions to achieve that purpose. It was not long before Chinese investors began trooping to State House confessing their loyalty to government and not Mr Mbabazi. Some made confessions about their dealings with Mr Mbabazi.
Civil servants also jostled to disassociate themselves from the ex-premier. Their confessions gave Mr Museveni a deeper understanding of Mr Mbabazi political economy.

But Museveni knew Mr Mbabazi was not entirely wrong. It is him who had accessed the wine of power to Mbabazi and kept his glass full. But he did not want Mr Mbabazi to be in charge of the wine store.

When it became apparent that Mzee wants to stay in charge but Mr Mbabazi was the main obstacle, the spirits that had been inactive in the political cemetery caused by Mr Mbabazi, became active at the urging of Mr Museveni, to the former premier’s disadvantage.

Guilt haunted Museveni

The Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the NRM bayed for Mbabazi’s blood. They wanted him to face the party’s disciplinary committee and eventually get dismissed. Some wanted him suspended from the party.

At the first meeting of CEC where these proposals had been floated, Mr Mbabazi and his politically belligerent wife Jacqueline asked that they meet the President in camera before they proceed with CEC. Mr Museveni adjourned CEC meeting for an hour and met the couple.

In that meeting, the Mbabazi family reportedly reminded Mr Museveni what he had earlier told them—that Mbabazi would be the next Commander-In-Chief and President of Uganda. Jacqueline did much of the talking albeit bitterly. Mr Mbabazi reportedly told the President that judging the mood of CEC members, it would be damaging for a career he had built for more than 40 years, to end in a dismissal or suspension. That they should find a better way he can exit party leadership without appearing to have been thrown away.

They agreed to find a legal way of removing him. And they agreed to call a delegates’ conference to make amendments to the constitution thus give a smooth exit to Mbabazi. The agreement is that having known each other that long, they needed to part ways—if it came to that – without reaching a situation where they might be forced to “undress” each other.

Mr Museveni agreed. After the meeting with the Mbabazis, Mr Museveni returned to adjourn CEC meeting to the next day telling them that he had agreed with Mr Amama to call the delegates’ conference. The CEC members were infuriated. They argued that it was expensive to call the delegates’ conference because the party had no money.

Mr Museveni said he would mobilise the money. To assuage the CEC members, Mr Museveni gave in to the idea of Mbabazi going on leave. But I am told that by opting for a delegates’ conference, Mbabazi had hoped to use his networks to shortcut Mr Museveni at the conference.

However, Mr Museveni appointed a committee headed by Information minister Rose Namayanja to popularise the conference and to ensure that Mbabazi networks were dismantled before the conference that took place last week. The two basically engaged in the battle of wits and cunningness.

In subsequent meetings, Museveni and the Mbabazis would engage in banter, sharing jokes like they had no problems. But their supporters were hyper. The conference managed to save Mr Mbabazi from ending his NRM career on a traumatic note - he is now free to remodel his politics without the burden of a bad NRM CV. It also helped Mr Museveni sustain his grip on power. Those familiar with Mr Museveni, speculate that, after vanquishing Mr Mbabazi, the President will sooner than later call him to extend an olive branch.

The lesson to Mr Mbabazi is that if he had believed that he knew Mr Museveni well, having worked together for long, then he has now truly known him better-he is a combination of nobility, brutality, intelligence, cunningness and magnanimity. He uses each of the attributes as and when it serves him well.

The lesson to the Ugandan political class is that rushing to conclusions basing on surface dynamics instead of digging out issues beneath the carpet, diminishes your ability to cause the change you want.

The conference was not called to bury Mbabazi. It was to save his career. No wonder, when Mr Museveni was greeting senior leaders after at the conference, Jacqueline Mbabazi whispered something to his ear, to which Mr Museveni responded: “That is our family matter.” Yes, it’s a family; a political family of tricksters.

Gen Sejusa and the timing of his return
The story of how the coordinator of Intelligence Services, the Maverick David Sejusa formerly Tinyefuza left the country and spewed all sorts of revelations is another one. All what I gather, the return was largely on empathy.

Gen Sejusa had lost his father while in exile. He was reportedly getting uncomfortable crafting a new life in exile in an advanced society that frowns at feudalism. Mr Museveni agreed to the unconditional return on two grounds: Sejusa intimates to him the actions of dissidents abroad. The timing of the return was Mr Museveni’s idea. He didn’t want the NRM delegates’ conference to attract international media attention which would be scrutiny. Sejusa’s return gave the media something else to focus on.

Implications
However, Mr Museveni is also architect of his own political troubles. By pardoning Gen Sejusa who had even threatened war against the State, he now finds himself at crossroads should another serving army General make similar allegations.

Would Museveni pardon such a soldier like he has done with Gen Sejusa? What would happen to enforcement of discipline among soldiers? Worse still, what if the General from another region not the west, makes similar allegations, will the President extend an olive branch? Such decisions though magnanimous, leave President Museveni prone to accusations of tribalism and sectarianism; the two vices he vociferously speaks against.

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