Jawaharlal Nehru was torn between loving Chinese civilisation and securing Indian border

By Tansen Sen
It is edifying to read Jawaharlal Nehru’s letters about Chinese history written to Indira Gandhi from his prison cell in Dehradun in the early 1930s. His insights into the origins and evolution of Chinese civilization are impressive, the narrative is sound, and the world historical context within which he frames his account is truly inspiring. This knowledge and allure of China, a country he calls “India’s sister in ancient history,” shaped and determined Nehru’s vision of India-China relations in the postcolonial world.

Nehru’s first noteworthy encounter with the Chinese took place at the World Congress of Oppressed Peoples held in Brussels in 1927. The Chinese representatives at the Congress, which included Sun Yat-sen’s wife Soong Ching-ling, were mostly from the left wing of the Kuomintang Party. Impressed with these representatives and greatly influenced by the pan-Asianist discourse occurring among leading intellectuals in Japan, China, and India, Nehru started forminghis views about a civilizational affinity between India and China.

Nehru’s interactions with Rabindranath Tagore, his visit to China in November 1939, and the close personal relationship he maintained with Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Soong May-ling, deepened his admiration for China and its people. He frequently voiced his sympathies for the Chinese in their fight against the invading Japanese forces and initiated a medical mission to China that included Dwarkanath Kotnis. He was a key patron of Cheena-Bhavan in Shantiniketan, which he believed could play an important role in bridging modern India and China. Nehru also saw great potential in developing trade and industrial relations between India and China; strongly advocating, for example, commercial exchanges through the newly- built Burma Road.

The watershed moment in Nehru’s relationship with China came shortly before Indian independence. At the Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi in March-April 1947, a forum through which Nehru wanted to demonstrate the advent of the postcolonial world, the differences between India and China on the status of Tibet became apparent. The issue came to the fore when the organizing committee decided to invite Tibet as an independent country. China launched a strong protest with the interim Indian government. It was only after Nehru, through KPS Menon, assured the Chinese side that the conference would deal primarily with cultural and economic matters and that the issue of Tibet’s status would not be raised that Chiang Kai-shek agreed to send a delegation.

Nehru’s assurances were questioned, however, when the Chinese delegation found a map of Asia depicting Tibet as a separate country and the Tibetan flag displayed at the Conference. The Chinese delegation not only threatened to withdraw, but also refused to let India become the permanent host for future pan-Asian conferences. These disputes and public bickering were a blow to Nehru’s attempt to make India-China solidarity a reality on the world stage.

The Chinese for their part never trusted Nehru again. In November-December 1949, the former Kuomintang ambassador in Delhi Lo Chia-lun, whose request to remove the British-appointed Hugh Richardson as India’s representative to Lhasa was ignored by Nehru, suggested to Chiang Kai-shek that the Indian prime minister might recognize the newly-established Communist regime in China in exchange for their acceptance of the 1914 Simla Agreement. However, the Communist regime was also distrustful of Nehru, describing the Indian leader as a “stooge” and “running dog” of the British and American imperialists.

During the 1950s Nehru was torn between his love for Chinese civilization, his empathy towards the Tibetan people, and the need to secureIndian territories. It has been alleged, perhaps rightly so, that KM Panikkar, VK Krishna Menon, and S Gopal did not appropriately advise Nehru on these issues. Further, Nehru himself did not heed Sardar Patel’s warning in 1950 about the implications for India of a future Chinese military expansion into Tibet. Nor did he try to delve into the details of the territorial disagreements. For him these were trivial matters compared to the prospects of a grand civilizational bonding betweenIndia and China. Perhaps through the rhetoric of a bhai-bhai relationship, the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 recognizing Tibet as a region of China, and the hand-holding of Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nehru hoped to convince China that it should accept the Indian stand on the demarcation of the border areas. He may even have thought that the dual track of rhetoric and the so-called “forward policy” were conducive to India-China relations. Indeed, he remained committed, as seen from his unwavering support for the PRC’s entry to the United Nations, to the establishment of a peaceful and brotherly relationship between the two countries.

In this context of Nehru’s long engagement and deep faith in Chinese civilization, his decision to intern Chinese migrants in India when the relationship between the two countries deteriorated in 1959 cannot be comprehended. The punitive actions against the “Chinese Indians,” who would otherwise exemplify Nehru’s vision of unity between two great civilizations, suggest an acknowledgement of agonizing failure by the prodigious optimist on India-China relations. In 1943, imprisoned by the British during the Quit India movement, Nehru wrote, “What is there that draws China to India and India to China? Something in our subconscious racial selves? Some forgotten memories of a thousand years ago? Or just common misfortune? Whatever it may be, it almost seems as if it was the working of some unseen fate.” Right after jotting these lines, he added, “wishful thinking.”These two words about the India-China relationship must have echoed repeatedly as Nehru tried to come to terms with the geopolitical realities ofa postcolonial world exposed by the 1962 war.

(The writer is professor of Asian history and religions at City University of New York)