[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: IMRA asked Yonathan Lerner (no relation) who
directed the simulation, if the person playing the role of the Iranian had
the goal of getting nuclear weapons in order to deter others rather than, as
a true "Twelver", the goal of getting nukes in order to use them to bring
about an apocalypse. Yonathan Lerner explained in a telephone call that the
simulation followed developments in the immediate period after a deal and
so this matter did not come up.]

Simulation Exercise: The Aftermath of a "Bad Deal" with Iran
INSS Insight No. 624, November 2, 2014
Azriel Bermant, Yonathan Lerner, Tamar Levkovich
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7956

SUMMARY: As the talks between Iran and the P5+1 continue, the INSS Arms
Control and Regional Security Program held a simulation exercise to explore
possible developments following a “bad nuclear deal” – one that effectively
enables Iran to maintain a nuclear breakout capability. The simulation
highlighted some possible outcomes that could follow the signing of a “bad”
nuclear agreement with Iran, and on this basis recommended several courses
of action, including: Israel should act now to close potential loopholes in
any prospective deal through its contacts with the US administration and
with Congress; Israel should consider the content of a possible letter
signed by the US President offering security guarantees to Israel in the
event of an Iranian violation of the deal; and Israel should consider
cooperating with Russia in order to obtain a satisfactory agreement.

As the talks between Iran and the P5+1 continue, the INSS Arms Control and
Regional Security Program held a simulation exercise on September 29, 2014
to explore possible developments following a “bad nuclear deal” – one that
effectively enables Iran to maintain a nuclear breakout capability. The
assumption of the game's opening scenario was that an agreement that might
look reasonable could actually contain many interpretation loopholes that
render it “bad.” In the simulation, following Israel’s initial reaction to
the deal, Israeli, US, Russian, European, Iranian, and Gulf teams grappled
with the implications of the new reality. The objective of the game was to
spur a dynamic thought process regarding the possible implications if such
an agreement is signed with Iran.

The Opening Scenario

On the morning of November 25, 2014, following a marathon session of
negotiations in Geneva, Iran and the P5+1 reached a last minute agreement on
a comprehensive deal. The agreement removes sanctions against Iran in return
for the partial dismantlement of its nuclear program. US President Barack
Obama described the deal as a “landmark agreement that distances Iran from a
nuclear weapon and sends a message to determined proliferators everywhere.”

Israel is alarmed that the agreement does not deal with Iran’s current
stockpile of low enriched uranium, does not dismantle centrifuges, and
approves a reconfiguration of Arak that would enable limited amounts of
plutonium to be extracted from the heavy water reactor. The agreement
acknowledges Iran’s right to continue enrichment, though limiting the amount
of 3.5 percent enriched uranium readily available for further enrichment,
and provides for the phased removal of sanctions, even though the P5+1 have
exposed Iran’s clear violation of the NPT in the weaponization work it has
carried out. Israel’s dismay and anger over the deal was reinforced by the
reaction of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who declared that the
“agreement was a demonstration of Iran’s resolve and its refusal to buckle
in the face of pressure.” An Israeli official stated that as a result of the
deal, Iran could acquire a nuclear weapon within four months of a decision
to do so.


Key Reactions of the Relevant Players

Israel

After its initial negative reaction to the deal, the Israeli government
assessed its options. Since (according to the game scenario) the agreement
had to be approved by the UN Security Council, Israel decided to focus its
immediate efforts on encouraging the United States to adopt a UNSC
resolution that would "improve" the agreement. Israel decided that rather
than open the entire agreement to renewed scrutiny, the best diplomatic
course of action would be to raise its concerns with the United States
regarding five key areas that were particularly problematic: uranium
enrichment, plutonium production, the rather limited verification mechanism,
the development of the explosive mechanism, and the “sunset clause” limiting
the validity of the agreement. The Israeli diplomatic efforts were followed
by renewed military readiness to destroy the Iranian nuclear program.
Maneuvers and media leaks were ordered to suggest that the use of military
force was, once again, a credible option.

The United States

Though sympathetic to Israel’s concerns, the US administration was bound by
the signed agreement. Washington recognized that Iran would not accept any
revision of the agreement in order to meet Israel’s five concerns, and
sought to address them without unraveling the agreement. The administration
considered placating Israel by including an addendum to the agreement,
despite Iran’s opposition. It decided to request a 48-hour delay of a UNSC
resolution on the agreement in order to draft the addendum. The decision was
finally made to draft a “side-letter” to provide Israel with security
guarantees in the event of an Iranian violation of the agreement.

The US Congress

The agreement was signed after the US Congressional elections, but before
the inauguration of the new Congress in January 2015. The administration did
not discuss the agreement with Congress prior to signing it. For its part,
Congress was skeptical and very sympathetic to the concerns presented by
Israel and the Gulf states.

Iran

Iran was clearly satisfied with the agreement, and would not accept the
introduction of any changes to the deal. Iran’s leaders were concerned by
the 48-hour delay of the UNSC session, mainly because of domestic pressures
against the agreement. This development pushed it to take steps to
demonstrate concern, such as increasing coordination with Hizbollah. Iran
was not impressed by Israel’s threats to use force against its facilities,
believing that such threats were not credible in the current climate in the
Middle East. Iran perceived that it was in a win-win position, as there
would also be benefits if the agreement was not ratified, since Tehran had
avoided the “poisoned chalice” but had still demonstrated its sincerity in
reaching a deal. Moreover, a failure to ratify the agreement would show that
Iran’s suspicions regarding Western intentions were well founded.

Europe

Europe understood that the agreement was flawed, but believed it to be
better than no deal. Europe sympathized with Israel's concerns, but did not
view them as a higher priority than issues such as Ukraine and the threat
from Islamic State. It was important for Europe that disagreements over the
deal be resolved within the P5+1 framework and not solely by the United
States.

Russia

Russia was one of the main losers from the agreement, perceiving that it
would lose significant influence over Iran. Russia was concerned that Iran’s
return to the international fold would damage Russia’s political and
economic interests, with consequences for Moscow’s monopoly on energy
supplies in Europe. Russia was therefore prepared to act as a spoiler, and
perhaps surprisingly, quietly encouraged Israel to maintain its threat to
attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. In parallel, Russia sought to convince
Iran that it could dissuade Israel from carrying out an attack, and
exploited its influence with both parties to strengthen its own position in
negotiations with Iran. The Europeans proposed some concessions to Russia
over Ukraine in return for its acceptance of the Iran deal.

The Gulf States

At the official level, the Gulf states were restrained in their response and
expressed some satisfaction with the agreement, although much depended on
how it was implemented. However, behind the scenes, the states expressed
their concern, with tense discussions with the United States over the flaws
in the agreement. The Gulf states also held discussions with Egypt, Russia,
Pakistan, and China, as well as secret talks with Israel, which were leaked
to the press. Although no military understandings were reached, Israel and
the Gulf states agreed to maintain channels of communication.


Main Insights from the Simulation

a. The deal that appears to meet the needs of all the parties could
actually constitute a bad agreement, because of a lack of attention to the
technical details. The deal in essence enables Iran to remain a nuclear
threshold state and grants legitimacy to this status.

b. The assessment of any agreement with Iran requires an extensive
evaluation of technical considerations and terminology.

c. In order to obtain international support for Israel’s position, it is
recommended that Israel focus its diplomatic activity on no more than the
aforementioned five key problems that it identifies in the deal.

d. The opening scenario in which the US President signs an agreement
before the prior approval of the US Congress is a distinct possibility.

e. In the event that the agreement requires the approval of the UN
Security Council, there may be an opportunity for Israel to take diplomatic
action to try to influence the content of the agreement. Nevertheless, once
it is signed, there is little likelihood that Israel will succeed in this
regard.

f. The simulation demonstrated that US fears of an Israeli attack against
Iran’s facilities have diminished. It appears that the concerns over an
Israeli strike are no longer a significant factor among United States
calculations. This could well lead to strategic surprise should Israel
attack after facing a “bad deal.”


Recommended Actions

a. Israel should act now to close potential loopholes in any prospective
deal through its contacts with the US administration and with Congress.
Israel’s ability to influence Congress will be greatly reduced after the
elections, since the new Congress will not be in session until January 2015.

b. A letter signed by the US President offering security guarantees to
Israel in the event of an Iranian violation of the deal could help address
Israel’s concerns over the content of the agreement. It is recommended that
Israel give thought now to the content of such a letter.

c. Israel should consider cooperating with Russia in order to obtain a
satisfactory agreement. In a similar vein, the concerns of Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states over a nuclear Iran could provide an opening for
cooperation.

Conclusion

The simulation highlighted some possible outcomes that could follow the
signing of a “bad” nuclear agreement with Iran. Certainly, other
developments may arise in the wake of the game's opening scenario.
Nevertheless, the potential developments described in this simulation
provide some important insights for Israel in its diplomatic contacts with
the P5+1 over a possible agreement with Iran.


In light of the main insights to emerge from the game, and especially Israel’s
limited ability to influence a UNSC resolution following a P5+1-Iran deal,
Israel should act in the coming weeks to address the potential difficulties
that would arise from a possible "bad deal" before it is too late.