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Monday, October 20, 2014
Home Front has Become the Front Line

Home Front has Become the Front Line
The military confrontations of the last decade, had one characteristic in
common: the rear area was a part of the front line. Brig. Gen. (res.) Meir
Elran presents several recommendations for the future rounds
Meir Elran 20/10/2014
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=3174

The Home Front has Become the Front Line Operation Protective Edge was the
fourth in a series of severe military confrontations the Israeli civilian
front experienced in the last eight years, after the Second Lebanon War
(July-August 2006), Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip (December 2008 –
January 2009) and Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip (November
2012). In all four operations, in addition to the military front where IDF
elements were employed in combined arms moves against the opponents, the
civilian front was challenged and operated too, mainly by the
steep-trajectory threat that was intended to disrupt the day-to-day life of
the civilian population and inflict casualties and damage to property.

Admittedly, it may still be premature to conclude the last round and draw
system-wide lessons from it with regard to the functioning and conduct of
the Israeli home front. At the same time, it is already possible to point
out a number of primary issues that should be reexamined in depth through
the perspective of time and provided with revised concepts.

Hamas had prepared itself over the last few years for attacking civilian
objectives inside Israeli territory using two concurrent capabilities. The
first and primary capability is the employment of its massive arsenal of
largely home-made rockets (with different rockets possessing different range
specifications), which had been intended mainly to create a long-term
nuisance and disturbance effect. In the face of the innovative Israeli
solution in the form of the continuous operational function of nine Iron
Dome batteries, the essentially statistic offensive arsenal of Hamas
produced a relatively limited effect.

The other capability – the offensive subterranean tunnels – did generate a
widespread public resonance in Israel and produced a dimension of personal
fear among the inhabitants of the Israeli settlements around the Gaza Strip,
but it was neutralized by the offensive and defensive operations of the IDF
and did not succeed in physically harming the inhabitants of the area.
Contrary to these failures of Hamas, it was its defensive layout, of all
things, that proved its effectiveness as far as they were concerned, mainly
as it demonstrated long-term operational endurance and a relatively high
degree of effectiveness in hitting the IDF troopers.

The Functioning of the Israeli Population

Opposite this limited threat severity and despite the fact that this time
the settlements of the central region were subjected to the threat of Hamas
rockets, the Israeli public reacted well. Generally, the public obeyed the
directives of IDF Home Front Command, kept its non-vital activities to a
reasonable minimum and primarily, at the day-to-day level, returned to
normal functioning immediately after the alerts – even when those alerts
were frequent.

On the other hand, the functioning of the population in the south, mainly in
the Israeli settlements around the Gaza Strip, was different and consistent
with the much higher severity of the threat imposed on this population. The
widespread abandonment by local inhabitants to temporary shelters in the
northern part of the country was particularly prominent, even before the
offensive subterranean tunnel threat had become known. In the societal
resilience test, most of the inhabitants of the southern region, including
those living in the settlements around the Gaza Strip, scored fairly high
marks as most of them returned to their homes immediately after the
ceasefire option had become tangible, even if some of them expressed their
anguish and perfectly justified expectation of public support and extensive
and long-term government assistance that would guarantee their personal
safety and their ability to prosper and resume their day-to-day life.

This time around, the civil defense systems faced a relatively easy trial
which enabled IDF Home Front Command, the municipal authorities and the
other organizations to function adequately. The civil defense operations
were coordinated primarily by IDF Home Front Command, whose supremacy was
demonstrated practically although it was not yet recognized officially
pursuant to the demobilization of the Home Front Defense Ministry. In this
respect, the system did not emit any unnecessary “friction noises” this
time, even if the issue of system settlement that will determine which
organizations would be responsible for preparing the systems for emergency
and for operating them in an emergency has not been resolved yet. The
constitutional issue concerning the declaration of a state of war, or
national emergency, or irregular situation in the rear area, surfaced only
marginally, mainly owing to the financial implications associated with the
payment of compensations for damage to substantial sectors among the
population.

Protection Policy

The last round of hostilities has once again raised onto the public agenda
the question of what the protection concept of the State of Israel should
be. So far, despite various statements by political leaders to the contrary,
the ruling attributed to former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, according to
which “We will not protect ourselves to death” is still valid, mainly for
budget-related considerations. Apparently, the new reality renders the need
for public shelters obsolete, to some extent – but not the shelters in the
facilities of the education system; it has created a need for a widespread
deployment of mobile shelters, with the emphasis on unprotected residential
areas like the Bedouin settlements in the southern region, and calls for a
revised set of preparations opposite the mortar fire, mainly in border
settlements. One related question – a difficult reminder for which was
provided by the rocket that dropped close to Ben-Gurion Airport and led to a
two-day halting of air traffic – pertains to the protection of vital
national infrastructures that could serve as attractive targets for the
opponent’s missile arsenal in the future.

Some people regarded Operation Protective Edge as a nation-wide training
exercise for the Israeli home front (instead of the exercise postponed a few
months ago, owing to budget-related considerations). Admittedly, the
operation improved the preparedness of the civil defense systems and can
serve as a basis for future lessons. It is too early to know whether Hamas
will be able to upgrade its steep trajectory capabilities to the same
standard as those of Hezbollah, but the right thing to do will be to prepare
for such an upgrade with regard to their offensive capabilities as well.

In the field of active defense, the axiom according to which the Iron Dome
Order of Battle should be expanded has already become a cliché, but it must
be addressed seriously and promptly. In order for the State of Israel to be
able to provide appropriate protection to population concentrations, to
critical infrastructures and to the military power centers, the Iron Dome
Order of Battle should be doubled. The medium-range David’s Sling system
should become operational next year, but the staggering cost of this system
will not obviate the central position of the Iron Dome system. So far, the
Americans have financed most of the development and manufacture of those
systems. Israel may have to consider an investment of its own in the
advancement of this vital issue.

Repeated delays, both political and bureaucratic, have thus far prevented
the required settlement associated with the organizing of the civil front at
the national and local levels. Such settlement should clearly determine,
among other things, the responsibility and authority boundaries of the
various organs dealing with the rear area (home front) during a defense
emergency or in emergencies following natural disasters. Pursuant to the
recent operation, implementing said settlement, determining its elements and
backing it by legislation have become even more acute requirements.

Israeli society has demonstrated a high level of resilience during the last
crisis, as measured by its prompt recovery and return to a normal routine,
on the personal and national levels. The trial of the Israeli settlements
around the Gaza Strip has not ended yet and necessitates substantial
state-sponsored input. Additionally, it is still early to know how the
national economy will digest the interruption at the macro-economic level,
and how long it will take for the growth elements within the economy to
overcome the natural setback experienced during the operation. Economic
recovery, while providing adequate solutions to the defense and civilian
needs that arose owing to the operation, is a primary element of the
national resilience, which stands at the top of the elements of Israel’s
strategic response vis-à-vis its enemies.
==========
Brig. Gen. (res.) Meir Elran is the Head of the Program on Homeland Security
at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

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