Secretary of State John Kerry said on September 19 that Iran has a “role to play” in the fight against ISIS. Yet, only four days earlier, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei rejected such cooperation with the US against the extremist group.
Though Khamenei’s pronouncement should have come as no surprise, the US intent to keep pressing forward with at least some level of engagement with Iran in the battle against ISIS raises some uncomfortable questions for policymakers and military leaders.
First, do we actually have common interests with Iran in Iraq, let alone in Syria? As I discussed in June, aside from pushing back ISIS and keeping Iraq together as one country, the US and Iran have fundamentally different endstates in mind for Iraq and Syria. Iran does not want us in Iraq, neither now nor in the long term.
Iran will continue integrating their proxies and allies deeper into the Iraqi security structure and expanding their influence in Baghdad at our and our allies’ expense. More actively supporting rebels fighting to overthrow Iran’s critical ally, Bashar al-Assad, puts us in even more direct opposition to Tehran in Syria.
Second, how vulnerable will American forces be to the Iraqi Shia militia and Iranian proxies? Kerry and others have indicated we may ‘deconflict’ operations with IRGC Quds Force Commander Soleimani and his affiliated forces in Iraq. However, Iranian proxy Khataib Hezbollah (KH) and Shia militant and political leader Moqtada al Sadr have both said subsequently they oppose the US forces in Iraq. KH also implied they may start directly targeting American soldiers, as they did during the last Iraq War until our departure in 2011.
Most importantly, will our current approach to Iran’s activities in Iraq simply re-sow the seeds of the current sectarian crisis engulfing the region?
Iran’s aggressive and frequently tone-deaf efforts to expand its political, economic and covert military presence in the region over the past decade have stoked Sunni Arab fears of a Shia ascendancy that must be checked.
The resentment towards the increasingly sectarian, Tehran-backed regimes in Baghdad and Damascus provided the fertile ground for the initial support for ISIS among many Sunni communities.
By playing a prominent role in rolling back the terrorist group, abetted by the US and the Iraqi and Syrian governments, Iran could easily undermine Sunni willingness to resist the new ISIS caliphate. Without a Sunni uprisingagainst ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his forces, defeating ISIS is very unlikely.
Having other nations fight ISIS on the ground is a pillar of President Obama’s strategy. The great irony is the state most willing to take up this challenge, Iran, is also the one most opposed to our interests in the region and is, in fact, a primary source of the problem we now face in Iraq and Syria.
