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This story is from September 14, 2014

The deluge of development

Waterways turned into four-lane roads, wetlands filled up to build colonies and malls ... Srinagar's disaster was a long time in the making.
The deluge of development
Kashmir, it used to be said, is prone to three kinds of disasters — famines, fires and floods. The government can now prevent famines, and fires are quickly controlled, but floods are a catastrophe.
Srinagar is located at the pinched waist of the Kashmir valley. All the heavy rain and snow melt of south Kashmir must flow through a narrow stretch of about 10 km of flat land between the plateau of Srinagar airport to the west and the spurs of the Zabarwan range to the east.
It is on this natural swamp that the kings of Kashmir built their capital. Its central location and potential for river trade made it useful to traders and boatmen but it was always unsuited for living. Lalitaditya, a Kashmir king, did try shifting the capital to Parihaspura, an elevated plateau a few miles downstream, but the city’s residents wouldn't move. Which is perhaps why one night in a drunken stupor, he ordered Srinagar set on fire. To placate him, his prime minister burned some dummy structures at a distance to give the impression that his orders had been carried out. Of course he was remorseful the next morning and glad to find the city intact.
That Srinagar is unsuitable for living became evident, yet again, in the recent deluge. But the penchant for building on swamps continues till today. Now some people have begun to build on elevations around Nishat. Perhaps access to water made the risk of being flooded worthwhile but it cannot be a plausible reason any more.
People have been filling in the wetlands around Srinagar for construction just as they have been filling in the Dal. These unauthorized constructions have no drainage or a functional sewerage system. Back in 1988, the chief secretary had ordered that no unauthorized colonies be given water and power connections, but he was soon gone and the constructions continued.
When the snows melt in spring and through summer, many parts of Srinagar lie below Jhelum’s water-line. After the great flood of 1903, the bund between Sonwar and Ram Munshi Bagh was strengthened, and after the 1912 flood, a flood protection channel was built to bypass Srinagar. These measures fostered an illusion of safety and the city expanded well beyond this channel, without any plan. Much of it now sits at the centre of the wetlands constituting the old flood plain of the Jhelum. This is the area starting from Pantha Chowk all the way to Narbal including Bemina and the colonies along the bypass.

The Dal was nearly five times its present size in Akbar’s time. It linked up with Anchar Lake in the north and had waterways that led through the city that drained and channelled water. The Nallah Mar, one such waterway, was filled up and made into a four-lane road in the 1970s. The Dal itself also became a vast and surreptitious landfill site for housing; this continues even today as satellite pictures show. Landfills also enabled conversion of the wetlands around Hokersar on Srinagar’s outskirts into residential colonies. The complex hydrology of the water systems of Srinagar has been well studied, but the flood control department’s warnings were shrugged off. The urban development department and its field agencies lacked a vision of their own, but with a wink and a nod, allowed private developers free play.
Srinagar is a disaster zone because for more than a generation knowledgeable engineers were overruled. It was always known that Srinagar should not expand into the flood plain of the Jhelum, but construction is relentless. Raw sewage may pour out of overflowing septic tanks but houses will be built in the swamp. The government seems incapable of creating planned residential areas or stopping the operation of unscrupulous land mafias. But it does manage to create an artificial shortage of urban housing and, thus, allowing private builders to exploit a corrupted system.
The urban development department has failed to plan the spread of the city in the right direction and along the right axis. The Srinagar Development Authority, in marked contrast to the one in Jammu, has little to show for the money it spends. The master plans remain on paper, and the municipality ensures that compliance is impossible. These floods are a reminder of how politicians, administrators and government engineers create conditions for disaster in their pursuit of immediate pecuniary or career advantage.
Then there is governmental failure in the face of the flood. The bunds should have been patrolled, sandbags should have been ready to plug breaches and the government should have called upon its resources in other districts. If communications failed, police wireless from districts such as Kulgam, Baramulla and Budgam should have been located in flooded areas.
The state government could have and should have used its resources in Delhi to charter boats and fly in supplies to Srinagar. And where was the State Disaster Management Authority? The next big flood may come next year or after a century but one thing is certain; no lessons will have been learnt.
More dykes may come up now but construction in the swamps will continue. The plans now made should work with nature and not in opposition to it. Kashmir may be successful with Venice as a model which tries to work with nature, not in opposition to it.
The author is a retired IAS officer who spent his career in Jammu & Kashmir.
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