Jammu & Kashmir floods: How sluicegate of troubles opened in the valley

As efforts are on to grapple with the fury of the flood, the question uppermost on everyone’s mind is why Kashmir failed to manage slightly more than 100,000 cusecs of water.
Minor floods have been as routine an occurrence in Kashmir as the change of seasons. Jhelum river exhibits its ferocious face almost every year when it drains massive loads of water from the hills in south Kashmir. Engineers at the state’s Irrigation and Flood Control (IFC) department say Kashmir has a flood cycle of 55 years and “great floods” have been recorded in 1893, 1903, 1957 and 1992, with each inflicting massive losses.

However, this flood has caused more devastation than any other in the past and ruined Kashmir, mostly Srinagar city, the heart of the valley. Engineers and planners say successive governments in the state failed miserably on five major counts.

Choked Channels

When Srinagar is wrongly referred to as Venice of the East, the fundamental parameter for the comparison is the arterial network of the Jhelum in Srinagar city, a crisscross of channels between various lakes and marshes. Over time, some of the major channels got choked and their water retention capacity greatly reduced.

Among them is the nullah mar, which is now a shopping line from Khanyar to Chattabal. One of the biggest water channels linking the main river, Dal lake, a couple of small lagoons and smaller channels, this was the biggest exit route for the excess discharge of Jhelum. It was filled up during the reign of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah after his return to power in 1975 and was converted into a road, now the main venue of frequent clashes between the cops and restive youth. Engineers say this was the worst policy failure in the water management in the city that paved way for bigger blunders in the subsequent years.

Flood Basins Busted

Srinagar survived floods easily with excess discharge occupying the vast basins it once had around its serpentine track in the city. But this time when the water reached these basins, they had all long turned into posh habitations in the city – Rajbagh, Jawahar Nagar, Mehjoor Nagar, Gulbarga Colony, Nowgam, Tengpora, Pir Bagh and Bemina. Mostly marshes, these worstaffected localities have so high water table that in summer it requires barely 1.5 metres to bore a well.

Of late, the state government has invested heavily in creating infrastructure in these basins. In Bemina, which is still under neck-deep water, for instance, the government has about a dozen institutions and housing facilities for its workers. “Policy-makers had ignored floods so callously that in the master plan the flood basins are not marked,” said a senior officer in the state government.

Odd Infrastructure

Among the factors that contributed to the destruction were the two pieces of communication infrastructure built quite recently: the railway track and the upcoming alternative highway passing through the middle of apple orchards and the saffron fields. The railway track that connects Qazigund and Baramulla through Anantnag, Pulwama, Srinagar and Budgam slices the valley into two parts – the upper Kashmir and the lower Kashmir.

While the railway engineers kept small ducts for petty steams to stay connected under the track, there is no adequate connectivity for water between the two sides. Although the water levels are receding in most of central Kashmir, there are belts on the upper side of the railway divide where water levels remain unchanged due to lack of connectivity. The same is true of Srinagar bypass, built on a marsh, where water levels remained two-storey high between Nowgam and Lasjan on Friday.

Delayed Dredging

After the “great” flood of 1903, the British insisted on a substantial flood management plan for Kashmir. This led to creation of a 41.70 km long flood spill channel that would take off with 17,500 cusecs of discharge from river upstream of the city and rejoin the river after bypassing Srinagar.

Another measure to be approved was dredging out major part of the silt, reducing the velocity of Jhelum after it leaves Wullar lake in Baramulla. Successive governments have, however, ignored this important aspect of preparedness for floods.

Caught on the Wrong Foot

Kashmir failed to prove equal to the magnitude of the calamity also because of a serious dearth of basic infrastructure. There are just about 3,000 shikaras, 1,000 odd houseboats and not more than 10 motorised boats in Srinagar. Despite being flood prone, Jammu & Kashmir is among the few states that lack a flood warning system. Srinagar might outnumber all other states in bulletproof vests, but there may not be even 100 life-saving jackets.

All these issues added up to create a situation that, according to Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s own admissions, led to a lack of government in the state for 36 hours. Even on Friday, the government remained invisible barring two choppers that the state owns. The police control room, police headquarters, Kashmir headquarters and district police lines – the key institutions that handle crises – were still submerged.

J&K’s inability to create a robust disaster management force, despite availability of adequate funds, remains among its key failures especially after the October 2005 earthquake that flattened the areas straddling the Line of Control.