Vermont Supreme Court Issues Decision Regarding Ainsworth v. Chandler and Chandler Electric Company, Chandler v. Concord Group Insurance Company and…
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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: [email protected] or by mail at:
2014 VT 107
Nos. 2013-084 & 2013-209
v.
On Appeal from
Charles Chandler
v.
November Term, 2013
Charles Chandler, Pro Se,
Intervenor-Appellee (13-084) and Defendant-Appellee (13-209)
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund and Robinson, JJ., and Eaton,
Specially Assigned
1. REIBER, C.J. These consolidated cases stem from alleged injuries suffered by plaintiff
2. On appeal, plaintiff and defendant both contest the court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, and defendant contests the order granting summary judgment in favor of insurer. For the following reasons, we affirm with respect to defendant's motion to disqualify the trial judge, but reverse with respect to plaintiff's suit and reverse and remand for further proceedings with respect to defendant's claim against insurer and insurer's counterclaim for declaration of noncoverage.
3. We begin with the court's ruling on insurer's summary judgment motion. On appeal from a court's decision to grant summary judgment, "[i]n reviewing the facts, we give the nonmoving party . . . the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences." Buxton v. Springfield Lodge No. 679, 2014 VT 52, 2, ___ Vt. ___, ___ A.3d ___. The incident giving rise to these lawsuits occurred on
4. After visiting with defendant, plaintiff and defendant left defendant's office together, with plaintiff leading the way. Plaintiff walked down the longer set of stairs, but upon reaching the bottom of the second set of stairs, she tripped and fell to the ground. Plaintiff claims that the coil of wire previously stacked to the right of the stairs "caught [her] ankle" when she fell down. She stated that, although she saw nothing on the stairwell steps when she looked back at the stairs immediately after falling, she did see a wire protruding into the stairwell space from the spools sitting to the side of the stairwell. She claims to have sustained severe and permanent injuries as a result of the incident, including partial blindness, a severe ankle sprain, scrapes and bruises, and a fractured tooth.
5. The procedural history of the ensuing lawsuit is noteworthy. On
6. On
7. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in holding that she was a social guest, and that defendant did not breach his duty of care to her. Defendant argues that because the court erred in granting summary judgment in the underlying suit, the court incorrectly granted insurer's motion for summary judgment on mootness grounds.
8. We review the trial court's decision using the same standard as the trial court. Sobel v.
9. We begin with plaintiff's claim that the court wrongfully found that she was a social guest rather than a business invitee. The trial court applied
10. We have held that, where the facts do not conclusively establish a plaintiff's status, and a factfinder may infer multiple purposes for a plaintiff's presence on a defendant's premises, the question of whether the dominant purpose was business or social remains a question of fact for the jury. Farnham, 2003 VT 23, 11 (holding that summary judgment against plaintiff was premature because determination of whether plaintiff was a trespasser, invitee or licensee was question of fact). We need not reach the question, however, of whether the trial court in this case erred in determining plaintiff's status based on the primary purpose for her visit, because we reverse and remand for further proceedings in light of our recent abrogation of the common law distinction between invitees and licensees, as held in Demag v. Better Power Equipment, 2014 VT 78, 26, ___ Vt. ___, ___ A.3d ___. In accordance with Demag, on remand the trial court is to apply the standard of "reasonable care under all the circumstances," which "is no more and no less than that of any other alleged tortfeasor." Id. s26-27 (quotations omitted). In this determination, "[t]he entrant's status, no longer controlling, is simply one element, among many, to be considered in determining the landowner's liability under ordinary standards of negligence." Id. 26 (quotation omitted).[2] (http://info.libraries.vermont.gov/supct/current/op2013-084.html#_ftn2)
11. Were we to conclude that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to raise an issue of material fact on a claim of ordinary negligence, we could affirm the trial court on alternate grounds. See, e.g., Cheney v. City of Montpelier, 2011 VT 80, 8, 190 Vt. 574, 27 A.3d 359 (mem.) (affirming trial court on alternate grounds). Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence, however, to defeat summary judgment under an ordinary negligence standard. "Common law negligence has four elements: a legal duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, a breach of that duty, actual injury to the plaintiff, and a causal link between the breach and the injury." Demag, 2014 VT 78, 6 (quotation omitted). " 'Whether a defendant is negligent depends on whether his or her action was objectively reasonable under the circumstances; that is, the question is whether the actor either does foresee an unreasonable risk of injury, or could have foreseen it if he conducted himself as a reasonably prudent person.' " Id. 27 (quoting Endres, 2008 VT 124, 13). Here, the trial court held that defendant had no duty to warn plaintiff of the risk of injury from the piled coils of wire next to the stairs because the wire was "clearly visible, and the risk [that it] might fall over and obstruct the stairs was equally obvious to both the plaintiff and defendant." Further, the court found that the piling of wires next to the staircases "arguably did not create an unreasonable risk of harm." The trial court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment as to the elements of duty and breach.
12. We disagree. Given plaintiff's deposition testimony that she did not see the wire in the stairs before she tripped, and defendant's admissions that the area was poorly lit, covered in debris, and unsecured, a reasonable jury could conclude that either the danger was not open and obvious or that defendant should have foreseen the harm even if the danger was obvious. Thus, a jury could find that defendant had a duty to make the condition safe or warn plaintiff of the danger, and that he breached this duty. Cf. Menard, 174 Vt. at 479-80, 806 A.2d at 1005-07 (holding defendants not liable for negligence under either an invitee or licensee standard where danger of spiral staircase was obvious to plaintiff, defendants had installed a guardrail, area was well-lit, and there was no "foreign substance" on the stairs). Plaintiff also testified as to the elements of causation and injury, stating that defendant's breach caused the coiled wire to protrude into the stairwell, inducing her to trip and injure herself. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of common law negligence sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
13. Next, we address defendant's claim that his motions to disqualify the trial judge in this case were wrongly denied.[3] (http://info.libraries.vermont.gov/supct/current/op2013-084.html#_ftn3) Defendant filed numerous motions to disqualify the trial judge throughout the course of litigation. His motion filed on
14. Because of the claim against the administrative judge, the administrative judge referred defendant's motions to a new superior court judge, who denied both motions on
15. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge "shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." A.O. Canon 3E(1). Judges are "accorded a presumption of honesty and integrity, with [the] burden on the moving party to show otherwise in the circumstances of the case." Ball v.
16. Here, there is no basis to disturb the denial of defendant's motions. Defendant has offered no evidence to lend factual support to any of his allegations of prejudice. The fact that the trial judge has previously ruled against him does not, in itself, constitute evidence of bias. See Liteky v.
17. We affirm the decisions denying defendant's motions to disqualify, and reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. As to defendant's lawsuit against insurer, the court's
Affirmed as to the motions to disqualify; reversed and remanded as to the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant; and reversed and remanded as to the grant of summary judgment in favor of insurer.
FOR THE COURT
Chief Justice
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