Rajiv' s IPKF move was impulsive: Ex-Army man

CHENNAI: It was former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's impulsive decision, supported by an equally impulsive and flamboyant Army chief General K Sundarji, that pitched Indian troops into the Sri Lankan war, says Col. R Hariharan, who was in the thick of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) activity in the island nation from 1987 to 1990 as a military intelligence officer.
Endorsing former Union minister Natwar Singh's claim that Rajiv had not taken his cabinet into confidence before agreeing to send IPKF to Lanka, Hariharan said, "Rajiv Gandhi was used to taking impulsive decisions.His decisions on Punjab (Harchand Singh Longowal accord) and Bodoland were similar. He did not have time to listen to bureaucrats". Quoting from former foreign secretary J N Dixit's book ' Assignment Colombo', Hariharan said:
"The then external affairs minister P V Narasimha Rao was opposed to India signing an accord with Sri Lanka to fight insurgents in a foreign country."
Gandhi realised the seriousness of the Lankan crisis only when he visited Colombo for signing the accord, said V Suryanarayan, former professor of University of Madras and an authority on Lankan affairs. He himself was attacked by a Lankan naval sailor dur ing the guard of honour a day after he signed the accord.
"Gandhi sought RAW's views on reining in LTTE.
When he sought Sundarji's opinion, the Army chief said LTTE can be defeated in 72 hours. Sundarji had no idea about the ground reality in Sri Lanka. It is history that IPKF made a disgraceful retreat from Sri Lanka after 19 months. But the presence of IPKF in northern Lanka helped President J R Jayewardene divert his army and quell rebellion in other parts of the country," said Suryanarayan.
India had arm-twisted Jayewardene to sign the agreement and he had little option as no external help was forthcoming, particularly after India carried out Operation Poomalai by airdropping food supplies in Jaffna in June 1987, said Hariharan. "This showed India would not hesitate to use force if Sri Lanka ignored Indian concerns. This action probably also kindled Sri Lankan
Tamil expectations that India would re-enact another Bangladesh in Lanka and create an independent Tamil Eelam. But the accord not only underwrote India's support for a united Lanka, but also defused the fight for an independent Eelam. Ultimately, Jayewardene got India to fight LTTE," he said.
He said the Indian government should have taken a cue from LTTE chief Prabhakaran's Suthumalai speech, on his return from India, that he would not toe the Indian line.
LTTE made only a token surrender of arms, handing over unserviceable and obsolete weapons. "No one had factored that LTTE would turn out to be a major obstruction to the success of the agreement. Everyone, including the Indian government, intelligence agencies and the Army, failed to understand Prabhakaran's singular fixation on leading a militant pack to create a Tamil Eelam," said Hariharan.