[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: "Yet involving Iran, regardless of its conduct in
Syria and its close cooperation with Hizbollah, appears impossible, and
instead, dealing with Iran solely in the context of Iraq is highly
problematic."

Indeed?

Given what we know know about negotiations that the United States has
engaged in with various entities why assume that Mr. Obama wouldn't jump at
the chance to make a "pact with the devil", making nuclear concessions to
Iran in exchange for Iran doing some of the heavy lifting in Iraq.

It all hinges on a critical assumption:

If you really think that the Iranians will never push the nuclear button
and only want nukes as a deterrent to remain in power then the "pact with
the devil" means making it more challenging to check Iranian activities in
exporting terror etc. BUT it doesn't actually mean facilitating a nuclear
apocalypse.

On the other hand, if you are willing to drop the naive western approach
that deep down inside everyone actually shares "western values" and instead
accept the possibility that Twelvers actually believe in what they profess
to believe in and are willing to act in accordance with their beliefs, then
a deal between the US and Iran that pays for the Iranian defense of Iraq
with turning a blind eye to Iranian nuke building activity is indeed an
impossible deal.]
===========

The Collapse of Iraq: Strategic Implications
INSS Insight No. 560, June 15, 2014
Oded Eran, Yoel Guzansky .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=7086


SUMMARY: The fall of major Iraqi cities to Sunni extremists belonging to
the Sunni group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) may well have
implications beyond the borders of Iraq. Indeed, all of Iraq's neighbors, as
well as the United States, have cause for major worry about the immediate
and long term implications of the recent developments. Paradoxically, a
coalition of sorts has formed comprising countries that have an interest in
nipping the ISIS territorial entrenchment in the bud. While the United
States will need to take the leading role, it must first take some decisions
regarding the logic of providing the Iraqi army with advanced weaponry. The
risk that advanced weapons will fall into the hands of irregular forces and
be used immediately against the central government in Baghdad cannot be
ignored.
.
The fall of major Iraqi cities to Sunni extremists belonging to the Sunni
group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) may well have implications
beyond the borders of Iraq. The evolution toward the dissolution of the
country, which began following the US invasion in 2003 and the fall of the
Saddam Hussein regime, will intensify. The independent Kurdish region is an
established fact, recognized by most of the actors in the region. If the
Sunni takeover of central Iraq is not stopped, it could lead to the
establishment of a semi-independent Sunni area, with southern Iraq falling
easily into the hands of Iran. In such a situation, Iraq would become an
exporter of terror, with the various groups that operate there exploiting
Syria's weakness to expand their operations in the Middle East.

All of Iraq's neighbors, as well as the United States, have cause for major
worry about the immediate and long term implications of the recent
developments. The weakening of the central Iraqi government's hold on the
various parts of the country may serve Iran's interest in extending its
influence and potentially create an Iranian-controlled land link with Syria
and Hizbollah. However, this victory by Sunnis, who did not rely on Iranian
aid, will not be seen as an achievement in Tehran. Indeed the fall of
important Shiite cities such as Najaf and Karbala into ISIS hands would be
an Iranian nightmare.

Turkey will also view the developments in Iraq with concern. The terrorist
takeover of areas near its borders increases its fear that a security
problem will be created to the south, extending over parts of Syria and
Iraq, and that situations could develop that would force Ankara to take
military action, a move it has avoided until now. Turkey, with its Sunni
Muslim character, will be forced to monitor the movement into its territory
of elements identified with ISIS.

Jordan, which has already been flooded with over one million Syrian refugees
fleeing the civil war, is also anxiously watching the developments in Iraq.
The war in Iraq in 2003 prompted more than half a million Iraqi citizens to
cross the border into Jordan. While some returned to Iraq within a few
years, the Iraqi diaspora in Jordan still numbers some quarter of a million.
It will undoubtedly grow soon, given the mass exodus that has already begun
from areas conquered by ISIS. However, this is only part of the anxiety in
Amman. Jordan's borders with Syria and Iraq are creating heavy pressure on
the Jordanian army and security forces. Even if the Iraqi refugees use only
Karama, the sole Iraqi-Jordanian border crossing, and the Syrian refugees
use Ramtha and Jabir, the crossings on the border with Syria, and do not
attempt to cross illegally, Jordan's security forces will find it difficult
to block entirely the infiltration of sleeper cells and operatives into the
kingdom. Indeed, the border crossing with Iraq is in al-Anbar Province,
where ISIS has had considerable success since early 2014. Thus far, the
government in Jordan has successfully coped with the risks stemming from
domestic, political, and economic problems, but the developments in Syria
and Iraq could alter the internal balance that has been maintained until
now.

The Gulf states will also view with concern the deterioration of the
situation in Iraq and the territorial entrenchment of radical organizations
that lack any commitment to the conservative regimes, despite their Sunni
affiliation. The weakening of the basically Shiite central government in
Baghdad, which will allow greater freedom of action for sub-state terror
organizations in the northern part of the Gulf, cannot but be viewed with
concern in the Gulf states, which are already distressed by the diminished
US interest in the region. It is too early to assess the ramifications of
the ISIS seizure of major oil refineries in Iraq; over time this may impact
on Iraq's ability to export oil, and in turn, on the stability of energy
prices.

Paradoxically, a coalition of sorts has formed comprising countries that
have an interest in nipping the ISIS territorial entrenchment in the bud. In
Iraq itself, the Kurdish military force, the Peshmerga, has begun to
cooperate with the Iraqi army in order to repel the advance of ISIS forces.
The immediate question confronting the United States concerns the arming of
the Iraqi military. That vast quantities of weapons that have fallen into
ISIS hands in recent days, much of it of American origin, underscores the
risk inherent in arming the Iraqi army or the "favorable" rebels in Syria
with advanced weaponry.

In his May 28, 2014 speech at West Point, President Obama addressed at
length the question of fighting terrorism that is not "from a centralized
al-Qaeda leadership," but from "decentralized al-Qaeda affiliates and
extremists." Although Obama did not reject the possibility of unilateral US
action if the security of US allies is endangered, he intimated that in a
case such as that developing in Iraq, he would prefer to act in partnership
with others. ISIS was discussed extensively in the speech by US Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Anne W. Patterson, at the
US-Islamic World Forum in Qatar on June 9., 2014. Patterson stated, "I
believe we can do much together to contain and roll back the threat posed by
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's [i.e., ISIS} aspirations to
create a terrorist state in western Iraq and eastern Syria." She added that
"the United States and the countries of the region need to work in concert - ­
and overcome some differences -­ to develop effective policies and durable
solutions to this dangerous threat."

While the United States will need to take the leading role, it must first
take some decisions regarding the logic of providing the Iraqi army with
advanced weaponry, given the collapse of Iraqi army units that were facing
forces equipped with inferior weapons. The risk that advanced weapons will
fall into the hands of irregular forces and be used immediately against the
central government in Baghdad cannot be ignored. A different but no less
difficult question concerns Iran and the new situation in Iraq. Iran could
attempt to sabotage a joint effort if it is not involved in any way and sees
itself as deserving compensation in the nuclear realm, or at least an easing
of the sanctions. Yet involving Iran, regardless of its conduct in Syria and
its close cooperation with Hizbollah, appears impossible, and instead,
dealing with Iran solely in the context of Iraq is highly problematic. An
interesting question is whether this issue arose in the recent bilateral
talks between the United States and Iran or whether these talks dwelled only
on the nuclear issue. The attitude of the Gulf states on this issue is also
unclear, even though they may see the Iraqi issue as another opportunity to
test the possibility of turning over a new leaf in their relations with
Iran.

The achievements by ISIS are a milestone in the history of the Middle East,
even though they are not completely unprecedented. Hizbollah's success in
becoming a leading political force in Lebanon and the Hamas takeover in the
Gaza Strip are important forerunners. The danger that this will become a
permanent situation is clear to all of those directly involved, including
the United States. Therefore, ISIS may see its achievements become something
of a Pyrrhic victory: If the states in the region, under the leadership of
the United States, mobilize for the fight against ISIS, even its most
zealous fighters will have difficulty withstanding what they will face in
the campaign, both in the quality of the weapons and the steps that will be
used to cut off the organization's supply routes.

Israel naturally has great interest in the success of the struggle against
ISIS entrenchment in any area whatsoever in the Middle East. Even if the
group's efforts are not directed against Israel at this point, there is no
doubt of the ISIS strategic objectives, and any territorial or other
entrenchment by ISIS is a potential security threat to Israel.