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Sunday, April 6, 2014
The Erosion of the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire in Gaza

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: It would have been useful for the analysis also
to touch on the ongoing massive arms build up taking place in the Gaza Strip
of rockets and other equipment thanks to the "quiet for quiet" policy that
for the most part leaves the arms industry in Gaza able to function without
Israeli "interference"]

The Erosion of the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire in Gaza
INSS Insight No. 537, April 6, 2014
Yoram Schweitzer, Benedetta Berti, Shlomo Brom .
http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6841

SUMMARY: Recent weeks have seen a gradual erosion of the Egyptian-brokered
November 2012 ceasefire that ended operation Pillar of Defense. While the
first year following the ceasefire was characterized by a significant drop
in violent exchanges between the parties, with 2014 the situation has been
progressively less stable. Nonetheless, both Hamas and Israel need to
provide mutual reassurance of their interest in returning to a situation of
controlled conflict in the south, under which Hamas will “for the most part”
keep the quiet and Israel will “for the most part” retaliate in a calibrated
and limited way. Needless to say, this signal-based mode of conflict
management is far from stable, but short of a larger political engagement
and a revision of the current policy, it is the most plausible solution to
the current instability.
.
Last month’s escalation in rocket attacks against Israel originating from
Gaza began as a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reprisal operation following
an Israeli airstrike that killed three of the group’s militants. That
Israeli attack in southern Gaza was aimed at a PIJ cell that had engaged in
cross-border firing against IDF personnel.

This episode reflects the gradual erosion, since early 2014, of the
Egyptian-brokered November 2012 ceasefire that ended operation Pillar of
Defense. That unsigned ceasefire agreement was the clearest expression of
the Israeli government’s adoption in recent years of a policy of containment
of Hamas based on mutual deterrence. This new policy emerged as the previous
approach, in place since the aftermath of Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in the
summer of 2007 and aimed at bringing down Hamas, has been gradually set
aside after failing to achieve its objective. While the first twelve months
following the ceasefire were characterized by a significant drop in violent
exchanges between the parties, with 2014 the situation has been
progressively less stable.

For the purpose of achieving credible deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, the
Israeli government has been strict in responding to any perceived violation
of the uneasy state of quiet. It considers Hamas the de facto power
controlling Gaza, and thus holds it responsible for any attack on Israel’s
territory and citizens, regardless of who is the actual perpetrator.

At the same time, Israel’s policy of eyeing Hamas as the effective
government of Gaza is accompanied by the interest in avoiding an unnecessary
escalation and yet another extensive operation in the Strip. So far Israel
has focused its attacks mostly on PIJ targets in Gaza, or any other
organization that launches rockets and violates the ceasefire, signaling a
desire to prevent an all-out escalation ? an interest shared by Hamas. At
the same time, the Israeli government has been putting pressure on Hamas to
control all potential spoilers operating in Gaza, from the PIJ to the local
Salafi-jihadist factions. The threat of full reoccupation of Gaza and
forcible removal of Hamas made recently by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor
Lieberman should be read in this context.

For its part, Hamas must contend with the complex problem of preserving its
control over Gaza, which in turn requires preventing extensive or frequent
confrontations with Israel while not jeopardizing its credibility as the
“Islamic resistance.” A sharp decline in credibility or popularity could
indeed encourage other actors such as the PIJ to present themselves as a
better alternative to Hamas. For these reasons, the group has alternated
between a zero tolerance policy with respect to uncoordinated attacks
against Israel, with periods when it relaxed its hold on the Strip, wary
lest crackdowns on other militant organizations damage its reputation.

Keeping internal challengers at bay is especially important to Hamas, given
its increasingly complicated position. Since the ouster of the Morsi
government, Egypt’s new political authorities have taken an especially harsh
attitude with respect to Hamas, imposing prolonged closures of the border
between Gaza and Egypt, while cracking down on underground tunnels, which
not only serve to smuggle weapons but also play a crucial role in importing
basic commodities into Gaza. This has caused substantial economic damage to
the Hamas government, as well as to the Gaza population. In addition, the
new Egyptian government has launched an open political confrontation against
Hamas based on the organization’s historic connection to the Muslim
Brotherhood, declaring the organization illegal and accusing it of being a
terrorist group and supporting terrorism in both Sinai and Egypt proper.
While Hamas has responded to the loss of the Egyptian ally by working on
rehabilitating its relations with Tehran and investing in maintaining Doha
and Istanbul on its side, these partners cannot compensate for the loss of
the strategic relationship with Egypt. In turn, this explains why, overall,
Hamas has been extremely cautious in formulating its policy with respect to
Egypt, mindful of not worsening the already problematic relations and
repeatedly attempting to calm the situation and restore a working
relationship.

Hamas thus has even more of an interest in not entering another round of
direct military confrontation with Israel. This then requires defusing
escalations and obtaining greater control of the Strip. Hamas continues to
have conflicting relations with a number of smaller armed factions operating
in Gaza, including the small and loosely organized Salafi-jihadist camp. In
the past year, these groups have often been behind the periodic escalations
in the form of rocket attacks, and with the increased activism of jihadist
groups in neighboring Syria, Lebanon, Sinai, and Egypt itself, these groups
may feel the desire to raise their profile in Gaza as well. Even though
their military capabilities are relatively minor, these groups have in the
past been a political nuisance for Hamas, by attacking its governance
record, criticizing its “moderation,” and launching uncoordinated attacks
against Israel regardless of the consequences for Gaza. The relationship
with the Islamic Jihad is also potentially problematic, even though both
Hamas and PIJ leaders aver that their relationship is strong and their
actions are coordinated. However, the rise in the PIJ status and its freedom
of action can become an increasing source of friction between the two
groups, which have a history of recurrent tension. This is especially the
case given PIJ’s historical and current closeness to Iran and its interest
in raising its profile domestically at the expense of Hamas by attacks
against Israel.

Hamas as such seems caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand,
actively intervening to prevent the PIJ campaign against Israel in
retaliation for the killing of its own militants would have been a bad
option for Hamas, resulting in worsening internal relations and discrediting
the group. On the other hand, the current economic and political crisis
makes it important for Hamas to preserve quiet with Israel. To accommodate
these competing interests, Hamas needs to play a complex signaling game with
Israel. In this sense both parties need to provide mutual reassurance of
their interest in returning to a situation of controlled conflict in the
south, under which Hamas will “for the most part” keep the quiet and Israel
will “for the most part” retaliate in a calibrated and limited way. Needless
to say, this signal-based mode of conflict management is far from stable,
but short of a larger political engagement and a revision of the current
policy, it is the most plausible solution to the current instability.

Another potential option for Hamas, as it attempts to resolve these
contradictions, is to try to increase its operations in the West Bank, which
it does not control directly, thus attempting to shield itself from direct
retaliation. Indeed it is possible that the noticeable increase in Hamas
activities in the West Bank could be connected to these considerations.
Israel should accordingly maintain a good and cooperative relationship with
the Palestinian Authority, notwithstanding a possible crisis that may follow
a sour end of the negotiation period. Otherwise Hamas and other groups may
take advantage of the tension and growing frustration among Palestinians in
the West Bank, and attempt to ignite a return to armed struggle and violence
as the preferred way to engage with Israel.

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